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Summary Judgment in Pennsylvania: Time for

Another Look at Credibility Issues
J. Palmer Lockard*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, courts and commentators in the United States
have recognized that the stereotypical plenary jury trial wastes
judicial resources and unnecessarily delays resolution of the
underlying legal dispute in many civil cases.' Prosecuting a case
to a jury verdict can also be a frustrating and expensive experience for litigants. Many lawsuits are characterized by either
minor or non-existent disputes over relevant facts, and such
cases may be appropriately resolved by a more summary process
than a full-blown jury trial.2 In recognition of this phenomenon,
courts and administrators have attempted, since at least the
eighteenth century, to fashion procedures that expedite civil litigation. Default judgments, judgments on the pleadings, summary judgments and directed verdicts allow courts to enter
judgments at various points during the course of the proceedings
prior to submitting the case to the jury. The most recent of these
* Assistant Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law; B.A. 1973,
Drew University; J.D. 1978, Washington & Lee University. The author thanks all the
generations of students who have helped him in the preparation of this article.
1. Complaints about legal delays have been voiced since at least the eighteenth
century. See, e.g., RIcHARD B. MoRRis, STUnms IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 48
(1930) (noting that during the eighteenth century, "business men frequently expressed
impatience with... the long, involved, and expensive character of lawsuits"). In 1889,
David Dudley Field termed the delays in the administration of justice 'scandalous."
David Dudley Field, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association
(August 30, 1889), in REPORT OF THE TWELFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, 1889, at 229. The delays have often been attributed to the right to trial by
jury. See, e.g., SMEON E. BALDwN, THE AMERICAN JuDiciARY 367 (1905).
2. "Summary" in this sense refers to any process that resolves a legal dispute
without going through a full-blown jury trial. Some summary procedures are more truly
summary than others. In fact, modem summary judgment allows the submission to a
court of all evidence that would be available at trial except for testimony. Even this evidence, however, is often submitted in the form of affidavits or transcripts of depositions.
Modem summary judgment may therefore embody a process that is more "semi-plenary"
than truly summary.
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procedural devices to achieve trans-substantive application is
summary judgment.3
The summary judgment procedure allows any party in litigation to file a motion with the court seeking an entry of judgment
in its favor. The court may grant the motion when there are no
disputed issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.4 Proponents of summary judgment
view it as a speedy, inexpensive vehicle for the resolution of lawsuits. Although the procedure may achieve this goal in many
instances, it has also been roundly criticized, with most of the
criticism focusing on the expense, delay and potential for an
improper denial of a plenary jury trial.5
Despite the criticisms of summary judgment, courts and commentators have strenuously advocated its use as a means to alleviate pressures on court dockets. Formerly characterized as "an
extreme and treacherous remedy" 7 in the federal fora, the summary judgment motion is, in fact, now praised by the Supreme
Court as "not... a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather...
an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole."'
In the state court arena, some courts have happily joined in
the movement to expand the usage of summary judgment,' while
3. Summary judgment did not find widespread usage in American courts until the
twentieth century. See infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text. By contrast, the
demurrer, another procedural mechanism for keeping a case from the jury, was recognized by William Blackstone. 3 Wn.LiLm BLAcKSTONE, CommENTARis 314 (date). The
directed verdict existed during the eighteenth century, although it was not until 1943
that the Supreme Court passed on its constitutionality. Galloway v. United States, 319
U.S. 372 (1943).
4. See JACK H. FREIDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 9.3 (2d ed. 1993).
5. The fact that a procedure designed to alleviate delay and expense has been
criticized for exacerbating those very evils is somewhat bemusing. The problem arises
because an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment adds an additional layer to the
judicial process. As recently as 1992, a justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court called for
the abolition of summary judgment, writing: "In the amount of time it takes the parties
to file a summary judgment motion, respond to it, and have the court review it, the matter
could have been disposed of by a full trial ....
This writer feels that [the Mississippi
summary judgment rule] should be abolished .... " Allen v. Mayer, 587 So. 2d 255, 262

(Miss. 1991)(McRae, J., concurring).
6. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Pierce, Summary Judgment: A Favored Means of Summarily Resolving Disputes, 53 BROOK L. REv. 279 (1987); Martin B. Louis, Federal Sum-

mary Judgment Doctrine: A CriticalAnalysis, 83 YALE L. J. 745 (1974).
7. Croxen v. United States Chem. Corp., 558 F. Supp. 6, 7 (N.D. Iowa 1982). Judicial statements cautioning against the use of summary judgment are common. See John
J. Watkins, Summary Judgment Practice in Arkansas: Celotex, the Scintilla Rule, and
Other Matters, 15 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 1, n.1 (1992).

8. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
9. Most of the recent movement in the state court arena has been the affirmation
of the Supreme Court's holding in Celotex. See, e.g., Lawson State Community College v.
First Continental Leasing Corp., 529 So. 2d 926 (Ala. 1988); Irwin v. Jones, 832 S.W.2d
827 (Ark. 1992); Thorns v. Idaho Ins. Agency, 887 P.2d 1034 (Idaho 1994).
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others have either refused to follow the federal lead' ° or simply
ignored the situation. Pennsylvania appears to be in the latter
category, as it employs a more exacting summary judgment standard than the federal courts without explicitly rejecting the
approach taken to this procedure by the Supreme Court.
In Pennsylvania, the standard for granting a summary judgment motion has remained static since the first rule of civil procedure authorizing the use of the motion came into existence in
1966.11 Pennsylvania's standard for granting the motion is stringent in comparison to the standards of other states, which may
be a result of the liberalization m the use of summary judgment
that has taken place elsewhere.12 The first hurdle that an advocate seeking summary judgment in Pennsylvania must overcome
comes from the so-called Nanty-Glo rule, which prohibits an
award of summary judgment when the movant's supporting evidence is testimonial in nature. 3
In Borough of Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co., 14 borough
auditors accused the tax collector for the Borough of Nanty-Glo of
embezzling a sum of money in excess of three thousand dollars.15
The borough brought suit against the collector and surety com10. See, e.g., Denver v. Block 173 Assoc., 814 P.2d 824 (Colo. 1991). In Denver, the
plaintiff landowners filed suits against various state and local officials in both state and
federal courts. Id. at 824. The suits alleged a conspiracy by the officials to deny the
plaintiffs their rights under state and federal law. Id. at 828. The federal suit was dismissed on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Id. The defendants then
sought to have the state action dismissed, arguing that the federal court's determination
should act as res judicata in state court. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court refused to give
the federal summary judgment decision res judicata effect, noting that the holding of the
Supreme Court in MatsushitaElectricIndustrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986), creates a standard for deciding summary judgment motions that "differs from the
standard applied to summary judgment motions in federal [sic] and Colorado state court
.... " Id. at 834 n.11.
11. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first promulgated a summary judgment rule
in 1966. 3 GOODRICH-AmRA 2D § 1035:2 (1991). Prior attempts to introduce the procedure to Pennsylvania practice had been rebuffed because of the lack of formalized discovery procedures in Pennsylvania and because of a belief that the "modest amounts in
controversy" in state court litigation did not justify wide-spread use of the procedure. Id.
12. While it is difficult to produce empirical proof showing that courts are granting
summary judgment motions more frequently, commentators certainly believe that the
federal courts are moving in that direction. See Marcy J. Levine, Comment, Summary
Judgment: The Majority View Undergoes a Complete Reversal in the 1986 Supreme
Court, 37 EMORY L. J. 171, 214 (1988)(noting the "liberal summary judgment attitude
expressed by the [Supreme] Court").
Reported state court decisions also justify a conclusion that the motion is being
granted with somewhat greater frequency. See, e.g., Kidd v. Early, 222 S.E.2d 392 (N.C.
1976)(permitting trial courts to give greater weight to testimonial evidence in ruling on
summary judgment motions).
13. See Resolution Trust Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh, 638
A.2d 971 (Pa. 1994); Penn Center House, Inc. v. Hoffinan, 553 A.2d 900 (Pa. 1987).
14. 163 A. 523 (Pa. 1932).
15. Nanty-Glo, 163 A. at 524.
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pany that bonded the collector after the tax collector failed to
fully reimburse the borough for the loss.16 At trial, the borough

called as witnesses both the tax collector and clerk of the borough
council. 7 The tax collector testified that he had collected the tax
money, failed to turn it over to the borough and used it for his
own purposes.' 8 The clerk of the borough council testified that
the bonding company had been promptly notified of the loss.1 9
The trial court found the cumulative effect of the two witness'
testimony adequate to establish a prima facie case for the borough, and0 at the conclusion of the trial, directed a verdict for the
borough.

2

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
trial court improperly directed the verdict. 21 The court, quoting
from Reel v. Elder,22 stated the following:
However clear and indisputable may be the proof when it depends

upon oral testimony, it is nevertheless the province of the jury to
decide, under instructions from the court, as to the law applicable to
the facts, and subject to the salutary power of the court to award a
new trial if they should deem the verdict contrary to the weight of the
evidence.23
Nanty-Glo, therefore, stands for the proposition that a court may
never direct a verdict or grant summary judgment when any necessary element of the plaintiff's case is proven solely by testimonial evidence. 24 The Nanty-Glo court mentioned no exceptions to
the rule, with the apparent intention that the rule should be followed regardless of whether the witnesses had an interest in the
outcome of the litigation.25
16. Id. The borough initially filed suit against only the surety company, and subsequently joined the tax collector as an additional defendant. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Nanty-Glo, 163 A. at 524. In Pennsylvania, a trial court may direct a verdict
.only in a case where the facts are all clear, and there is no room for doubt." Stephens v.
Carrara, 401 A.2d 821, 822 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). In ruling on the motion, the court must
accept as true all testimony offered by the party opposing the motion. Id.
A grant of a directed verdict effectively eliminates the jury's role as fact-finder as
the judge literally directs the jury to return a specific verdict. The jury is then dutybound to return a verdict as directed. Cherniak v. Prudential Ins. Co., 14 A.2d 334 (Pa.
1940).
21. Nanty-Glo, 163 A. at 524.
22. 62 Pa. 308, 1 Am. Rep. 414 (1863).
23. Nanty-Glo, 163 A. at 524.
24. While Nanty-Glo was a directed verdict case, the standard for directed verdicts
and summary judgments is the same in Pennsylvania. Bremmer v. Protected Home Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 260 A.2d 785, 786 (Pa. 1970).
25. See Nanto-Glo, 163 A. at 523. If the Nanty-Glo court believed that directed
verdicts could be based on the testimony of interested parties, it neglected to mention
that fact. Such an omission is curious, given the fact that the tax collector whose testi-

1997

Summary Judgment in Pennsylvania

629

The Nanty-Glo rule is apparently bottomed on two beliefs that
currently receive less unquestioned acceptance than they
received in the American jurisprudence of the nineteenth century. The first belief is that the determination of whether a witness is credible is a matter properly left to the finder of fact.26
During the nineteenth century, courts granted the jury almost
unfettered liberty in making this determination. 27 Even if a witness was uncontradicted, the jury was at liberty to disbelieve the
witness's testimony.28
The second belief is the belief in the efficacy of cross-examination as a means of attacking the credibility of a witness. 29 A witness who is unimpeached by extrinsic evidence might still be
disbelieved because of answers that are elicited from him or her
during cross examination. Disbelief in a witness's credibility
may result from either the content of the witness's answers or
the demeanor of the witness while providing the answers. Nineteenth century practitioners commonly believed that it was, in
fact, the rigors of cross-examination in open court that were necessary to evoke behaviors that a witness might otherwise be able
to conceal.30
The Pennsylvania prohibition against granting summary judgment when the motion is based on testimonial evidence applies
mony provided some part of the basis for the directed verdict was clearly an interested

party.
26. Credibility is, quite naturally, of great importance in the trial setting. As noted
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:
[Tihe credibility of a witness is the most substantial element of his qualifications as a witness. Without credibility a witness is a figure of straw; his words
are but shredded syllables in the winds of controversy; and he is a phantom in a
gathering of serious persons convened for a serious purpose.
DeJohn v. Orell, 240 A.2d 472, 475 (Pa. 1968). In determining whether a witness possesses that quality which makes his or her evidence worthy of belief, courts (and individuals in general) take into account an immense number of factors, many of which are
discussed in this article.
27. See, e.g., Shults v. State, 55 N.W. 1080 (Neb. 1893).
28. For a modern case demonstrating the fact that courts continue to defer to the
jury in witness credibility matters, see Bronchak v. Rebmann, 397 A.2d 438 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1979). The extreme deference to the jury in matters of this sort was also typical of
nineteenth century courts. See Edson R. Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American
Jury, 13 MICH. L. REv. 302 (1915).
29. Probably the best known statement in this regard is John Henry Wigmore's
expression that cross-examination is "the greatest legal machine ever invented for the
discovery of truth." 5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chadbourne Rev. 1974).

30. One practitioner noted: "It is not easy for a witness, who is subjected to [cross
examination] to impose on a Court or jury." SIMON GREENLEAF, LAw OF EVIDENCE, § 446
(16th ed. 1899). See also S. MARCH PHILLPS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 895 (4th Am. ed.

1859)(providing: "The power of cross examination is generally allowed to afford one of the
best securities against incomplete, garbled, or false evidence.").
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even when the adversary does not oppose the motion. 3 1 This rule
is certainly contrary to federal summary judgment jurisprudence,3 2 however it is not unique in American law.33 Virtually all
jurisdictions have recognized that a grant of summary judgment
(or the direction of a verdict) based on testimonial evidence
involves some theoretically troubling issues, including the important issue of when a court may legally prohibit a jury from disregarding an unimpeached witness' testimony. 4
While the Nanty-Glo rule generally disallows summary judgment in instances where the motion is supported by testimonial
evidence, over the years Pennsylvania courts have carved out
two basic exceptions to the rule. The first exception applies when
the testimonial evidence is merely cumulative and in addition to
documentary evidence supporting the same contention. 5 In this
situation, summary judgment may be granted.3 6 Second, testimonial evidence may form the basis for a grant of summary judgment where the evidence takes the form of a party admission.
This exception clearly applies in cases where the admissions are
elicited from a party-opponent who is also the respondent to the
motion.3 1 When the admissions come from a non-respondent
31. First Mortgage Co. v. McCall, 459 A.2d 406 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). See also
Marchese v. Marchese, 326 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1974).
32. See, e.g., Walter v. Fiorenzo, 840 F.2d 427, 434 (7th Cir. 1989)(noting that "[a]
motion for summary judgment cannot be defeated by an opposing party's incantation of
lack of credibility over a movant's supporting affidavit").
33. See, e.g., Speed v. DeLibero, 580 A.2d 1242 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990), cert. denied,
583 A.2d 130 (Conn. 1990); Alexander v. Tingle, 30 A.2d 737 (Md. 1943); S.C. Gray v. Ford
Motor Co., 286 N.W.2d 34 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
34. This issue may arise in either the summary judgment or directed verdict context. Not all jurisdictions have addressed the issue in each of these situations, and very
few have reported decisions addressing both situations. Courts that have decided the
question in either the summary judgment or the directed verdict context may, however,
be broken down into three major categories:
1) The group of states that allow a court to grant summary judgment (or direct a
verdict) based on any uncontradicted testimonial evidence, including testimonial evidence given by a party. This group includes Texas (Collora v. Navarro, 574 S.W.2d 65
(Tex. 1978)); Kansas (Walborn v. Stockman, 706 P.2d 465 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985)); and
Oklahoma (Geschwind v. Brorsen, 258 P.2d 619 (Okla. 1953)).
2) The group of states that allow a court to grant summary judgment (or direct a
verdict) based on uncontradicted testimonial evidence only if the evidence comes from a
disinterested witness. South Carolina appears to fall within this category, (Green v.
Greenville County, 180 S.E. 471 (S.C. 1935)), as does Arkansas (Bullock v. Miner, 286
S.W.2d 328 (Ark. 1956)).
3) The group of states that does not allow the court to grant summary judgment
based on uncontradicted testimonial evidence irrespective of the source of the testimony.
See Martino v. Palladino, 123 A.2d 872 (Conn. 1956).
35. Dillon v. National R.R. Co., 497 A.2d 1336 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
36. Dillon, 497 A.2d at 341-42.
37. Giannini v. Carden, 429 A.2d 24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
38. See Rivoli Theater Co. v. Allison, 152 A.2d 449 (Pa. 1959).
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party, the admissions will only support a grant of summary judgment if the interests of the party making the admissions are
adverse to those of the party making the motion.3 9 To the extent
that decisional law allows the admission of a non-respondent to
sustain a grant of summary judgment, the exception has clearly
been created post-Nanty-Glo, for some of the testimony elicited
at trial in that case was in the nature of an opposing party
40
admission and thus might have supported a directed verdict.
Notwithstanding these minor exceptions, the Nanty-Glo rule
is firmly entrenched in Pennsylvania jurisprudence. A party
wishing to obtain summary judgment must therefore support the
motion with documentary evidence or the admissions of a party
opponent. If the moving party fails to do so, the court should
deny the motion regardless of the respondent's action or inaction.
The Nanty-Glo rule applies irrespective of whether the party
making the motion will carry the burden of proof at trial.4 '
While the courts' concern for the role of the jury in credibility
determinations has been a constant in Pennsylvania jurisprudence for many years, recent scholarship has cast doubt on the
jury's ability to adequately perform that function.42 Given the
increasing awareness of the jury's limitations in credibility determinations, recent federal developments in summary judgment
practice and the promulgation of new Pennsylvania rules governing summary judgment practice, it seems an appropriate time
for the Pennsylvania courts to re-examine the Nanty-Glo rule.
39. See Thomas v. Duquesne Light Co., 500 A.2d 1163 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
40. An interesting variation on this theme may be found in Garcia v. Savage, 586

A.2d 1375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). In Garcia, the movant was a defendant who had been
sued for personal injuries allegedly suffered as a result of the negligence of his employees.
Id. at 1376. After suit was filed, the defendant joined the employees as additional defendants. Id. The employees eventually prevailed on their own motions for summary judgment. Id. Thereafter, the original defendant filed a motion for summary judgment
supported by the deposition testimony of the employees. Id. The motion was denied, at
least in part, because of the Nanty-Glo rule. Id. at 1380. The court held that because the
employees were no longer parties to the litigation, their interests could not be adverse to
the employer's and therefore their deposition testimony did not fall within an exception to

the Nanty-Glo rule. Id. If the employees had not already succeeded on their own summary judgment motions, perhaps the case would have been decided differently.
41. See Godlewski v. Pars Mfg. Co., 597 A.2d 106, 109-110 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
42. The number of articles questioning the ability of the untrained observer to
detect untruthfulness through observation of demeanor has greatly increased during the
present decade. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The
Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157
(1993); H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing
Through the Liar's Tale, 42 DuKE L. REV. 776 (1993); Olin G. Wellborn, Demeanor, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1991); Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation
of Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165 (1990).
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The remainder of this article examines the historical antecedents to modern Pennsylvania summary judgment practice and
suggests that the courts' concerns about the jury's role in credibility determinations may be adequately met by a modified
Nanty-Glo rule. The article proposes that the present practice
regarding credibility issues in the summary judgment context
should be modified by the creation of a bifurcated policy with different standards depending on whether the motion is made by
the party who will bear the burden of persuasion at trial or the
party who will not bear that burden. When the summary judgment movant will not carry the burden of persuasion at trial,
questions of credibility simply should not enter into the courts'
decision making process. When the movant will carry the burden, summary judgment should be granted on testimonial evidence unless the respondent demonstrates the existence of an
adequate basis to doubt the credibility of a witness.4 3 An adequate basis to doubt a witness' credibility exists when: 1) the
witness is the movant or has an interest in the outcome of the
litigation that would be advanced by the grant of summary judgment in favor of the movant; or 2) the respondent submits
impeaching evidence to the court that provides a reasonable
basis to doubt the credibility of a witness. The proposed rule
would have the benefit of providing greater flexibility to trial
judges in deciding summary judgment motions,"' while safeguarding the litigants' right to jury trial. While the rule would
not provide as liberal a basis for the grant of summary judgment
as the current federal standard, in that most federal courts seem
willing to grant summary judgment based on testimonial evidence of the moving party,45 it would liberalize Pennsylvania
practice while maintaining the courts' concern for the role of the
jury in credibility determinations.
43. This proposal is hardly original. Learned Hand hinted at such a rule in Radio
City Music Hall Corporationv. United States, 135 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1943), when he said:
When a party presents evidence on which, taken by itself, it would be enti-

tled to a directed verdict if believed, and which the opposite party does not discredit as dishonest, it rests upon that party at least to specify some opposing
evidence which it can adduce and which will change the result.

Radio City, 135 F.2d at 718. This also seems to be the rule presently used by some state
courts. See Kidd v. Early, 222 S.E.2d 392 (N.C. 1976). A similar test has also been proposed by commentators, most notably David A. Sonenshein in State of Mind and Credibility in the Summary Judgment Context: A Better Approach, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 774 (1983).
44. Commentators generally agree on the need for flexibility in the application of

trans-substantive rules. Their reasoning is that when a rule is applied to a variety of
cases, some flexibility must be provided so that the rule can be fairly applied to all the
possible fact scenarios that arise. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of
Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2081-85 (1989).
45. See, e.g., Lundeen v. Cordner, 354 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1986).
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II. FEDERAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE

Most commentators agree that the origins of modern summary
47
judgment6 can be traced to eighteenth century England.
Although the common law pleading used in the eighteenth century contained no direct counterpart to summary judgment, English courts of that time developed a procedure that enabled
plaintiffs in contract cases to circumvent the filing of "sham
defenses" by defendants.48 While an in-depth analysis of common law pleading is beyond the scope of this article, some explanation of dilatory pleading is necessary to an understanding of
how the modern summary judgment motion developed.
The common law countenanced, and in some cases approved,
certain pleas that were interposed by defendants primarily for
the purpose of delay. Chief among these pleas was the
imparlance, a plea whose sole purpose was to delay the proceedings. 49 To some extent, such a plea was encouraged because it
gave the parties an opportunity to discuss their dispute and
attempt to reach a resolution without direct court intervention.50
Other pleas, such as oyer, jurisdiction and abatement were also
often pled for the purpose of delaying the proceedings, although
these pleas may have had other purposes as well. 5 ' In addition
to these accepted pleas, however, it became a common practice
for defendants to plead "sham defenses" - defenses that were factually untrue.52 Defendants were able to make these false pleas
with relative impunity because the statements in the pleadings
were not made under oath and it was considered the sole province of the jury to determine the truth of factual matters asserted
46. In this article, the term "summary judgment" is most frequently used to refer
to a judgment entered after a motion filed pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1035 et seq. or the correlative rule of another jurisdiction. The term has often been used, however, to describe
judgments obtained without the benefit of plenary judicial proceedings, regardless of the
procedural mechanism involved.
47. See, e.g., ROBERT WYNESS MuLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
HISTOICAL PERSPECTIVE (1952). In all fairness, there is some disagreement regarding
the roots of modem summary judgment. Some commentators, if not most, trace the history of summary judgment to Keating's Act. See Louis, supra note 6. Others find the
roots of modern summary judgment in earlier English pleading practices, particularly the
motion to strike sham defenses. See D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its
Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with FRCP 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976).
48. See Risinger, supra note 47 at 17-29; MILAR, supra note 47 at 237-38. The
first English legislation in the area limited the procedure to cases involving bills of

exchange. The Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 18 & 19 Vict. c.67 (1855).
49.
50.
(1897).
51.

HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS (2d ed., 1901).
RICHAsD R. PERRY, COMMON LAw PLEADING: ITS HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES 187
See STEPHEN, supra note 49.

52. See PERRY, supra note 50 at 432.
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in pleadings.53 Therefore, there was little possibility that the
truth of a "sham defense" would ever be judicially determined,
and even if it was, the defendant would not be punished for the
false statement since it was not made under oath.5 ' Over time,
these "sham defenses" took on a stylized form that all practitioners came to recognize: the defenses were all based on the same,
or substantially similar, facts. 55 While the common sham
defenses were not met with approbation, attempts at creating
new factual bases for sham defenses were simply not permitted.5 6
English courts eventually lost their tolerance for the delay
attendant on sham defenses, and the practice of allowing plaintiffs to enter judgment on their own behalf by filing an affidavit
swearing to the falsity of the defense commenced. 57 "In this case,
if the court had reason to believe that the plea was not interposed in good faith, it would proceed summarily to set it aside on
affidavit of its untruth and allow judgment to go forthwith for the
plaintiff."5
This procedure was originally confined to cases
involving suits based on debt 59 and seems to have been the earliest form of summary judgment. It was an extremely limited procedure, available only to plaintiffs in contract cases, and only as
a response to the filing of a sham defense. Nonetheless, this procedure provided a party with a means to obtain judgment with60
out trial.
The early summary judgment procedures were justified as a
means for allowing creditors to obtain judgments against recalcitrant debtors without enduring the delays associated with the
normal common law pleading process. 6 Thus, the rationale for
summary judgment was primarily to assist individual litigants,

53. Henry B. Pogson, Truth in Pleadings, 8 N.Y.U. L.Q. 41 (1930).
54. Id. at 44.
55. J.C. PERKINS, CHrITrY'S TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PARTIEs TO ACTIONS (17th
ed. 1879). Some of the more common sham defenses were that the plaintiff had already
recovered a judgment in another court or that there had been an accord and satisfaction.
Id. at 697-98.
56. See STEPHEN, supra note 49 § 258.
57. See MnLAR, supra note 47 at 238.
58. Id.
59. See Risinger, supra note 47 at 26.
60.

See MILAR, supra note 47 at 237-39.

61. See John A. Bauman, The Evolution of the Summary Judgment Procedure,31
IND. L.J. 329, 329 (1956)(noting that demand for summary judgment procedure came "not
from the legal profession . . . but from laymen and in particular the newly ascendant
mercantile group that found the delays and technicalities of common law procedure
unendurable").
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and only2 secondarily, if at all, to alleviate stress on the judicial
6

system.

The English summary judgment practice was transplanted to
the American colonies and continued by the individual states
after independence.6 Although, like today, the process allowed
plaintiffs to obtain judgments in a summary manner, there are
substantial differences between the procedure used by the English and early American courts and the modern summary judgment procedure. For example, unlike the modern practice, the
early summary judgment practice did not allow the use of discovery to "pierce the pleadings" of either party. 4 Additionally, in
contrast to the perception of modern summary judgment as a
defendant's motion, 65 the procedure was only available to the
plaintiff.6 Perhaps the most significant difference is the early
restriction of the procedure to specified areas of substantive
law. While the early summary judgment procedures were not
always limited to a single substantive category, they were virtually all confined to a few areas, such as debt or contract, that
experience had shown were characterized by relatively simple
fact patterns and proof largely documentary in nature.6" By the
beginning of the twentieth century, however, these restrictions
on summary judgment use were viewed as unnecessary.69
Reformers had called for changes in the rule to allow for summary judgment use by plaintiffs and defendants, and for the
motion to be supported by materials extraneous to the record.7 °
The twentieth century expansion of summary judgment into a
trans-substantive procedure may have begun with a New Jersey
summary judgment rule adopted in 1912. 71 This rule, together
with the English rule in effect at the time,72 provided the models
62.

Id. at 333 (providing: "No doubt some of the delay in the disposition of litigation

could be attributed to the increased business of the courts, but there were defects in the
prescribed procedure which contributed substantially to this result.").
63. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 4 § 7.1.
64. Discovery was not readily available in civil litigation until the twentieth century. See FREmENTHAL, supra note 4 § 7.1.
65. This belief is supported by empirical evidence in the federal courts. William P.
McLauchlan, An Empirical Study of the Federal Summary Judgment Rule, 6 J. OF LEGAL
STuDIEs 427, 441 (1977)(revealing that 58.1% of summary judgment motions are filed by
defendants, 21.7% by plaintiffs, and 16.3% by both parties).
66. See Risinger, supra note 47 at 28.
67. See Charles E. Clark & Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38
YALE L.J. 423 (1929).

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 2 N.J. Comp. Stat. §§ 291, 292 (Supp. 1915); N.J. Practice Act 239-241 (1916).
72. English Order III, Rule 6 and Order XIV (1873).
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for a New York rule adopted in 192 1. 73 While commentators

characterized these rules as among the most liberal summary
judgment procedures in use in American jurisdictions, v4 their
reach does not seem to have greatly exceeded that of the older
rules. v5 These rules were, however, indicative of the movement
afoot in American courts in the 1920's to adopt new summary
judgment rules expanding the reach of the procedure.76 The
movement culminated with the adoption in 1938 of Rule 56 as
77
part of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 56 completed summary judgment's metamorphosis into a
trans-substantive rule.7. The new rule applied to all forms of
actions and provided that the motion for summary judgment
could be supported by virtually every conceivable form of evidence. 79 Summary judgment thus became the federal courts' preferred weapon for dealing with unsubstantiated claims.8 0 Rule
56, at the time of its adoption, marked a major, if not revolutionary, change in summary process in American law.
As might be expected, the federal bench was, by and large,
lukewarm to the new rule."' Part of the judiciary's reluctance to
73. N.Y R. Civ. PRACTICE 113 (October 1, 1921).
74. Clark and Samenow credit Connecticut with having the most advanced summary judgment procedure. See Clark & Samenow, supra note 67 at 423.
75. Indeed, an article extolling the virtues of New York's new summary judgment
procedure drew a response from a Pennsylvania lawyer implying that the new rule was
no more liberal than "the rugged common-sense" of Pennsylvania's affidavit of defense
practice. Ira Jewell Williams, Letter to the Editor, 10 ABA J. 212 (1924).
76. The movement toward the adoption of new summary judgment procedures can
be seen as part of a general trend toward the adoption of procedures designed to give
greater power to judges at the expense ofjuries. The trend is well documented in Stephen
H. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedurein
HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
78. In this sense, Rule 56 is typical of most of the federal rules of civil procedure.
See Cover, ForJames Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.
J. 718 (1975).
79. Rule 56, in its original form, did not specifically authorize the use of answers to
interrogatories in support of the motion. This oversight was corrected when the rule was
amended in 1963. The present rule now allows the motion to be supplemented with
almost every conceivable form of evidence. Testimonial evidence is explicitly allowed if it
is rendered in the form of affidavits, depositions, or answers to interrogatories. FED. R.
Clv. P. 56.
80. Rule 12 is, of course, available as a replacement for the old common law demurrer. With the introduction of notice pleading as part of federal practice, however, the
importance of pre-discovery dismissal motions has diminished. At least one commentator
has noted that "[t]he 1938 rulemakers placed primary reliance on Rule 56 providing for
summary judgment as the means to extinguish unfounded allegations, claims, and
defenses." See Carrington, supra note 44 at 2090. See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 327 (1986)(providing that summary judgment has taken place of motion to
dismiss).
81. Judge Clark noted that "[s]eemingly the procedure is not to be generally
favored" and accused the other members of the Second Circuit bench of having a "dislike
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embrace the rule may have been caused by a lack of familiarity
with the workings of a trans-substantive rule of summary process. While general trepidation to apply the rule may have been
reasonably anticipated, there were also expressed concerns over
82
the rule's potential reallocation of the duties of judge and jury.
83
The jury was the traditional and constitutionally mandated
trier of fact. Rule 56, at least in some instances, seemed to
require the usurpation of the traditional jury role by the court.
The grant of summary judgment meant that the party opposing
the motion would never have the opportunity to present evidence
to a jury nor attack the movant's evidence before a jury. Thus, in
some sense, a grant of summary judgment (like the direction of a
verdict) deprived the respondent of a constitutionally guaranteed
right. It is hardly surprising that a new rule with the potential
to so seriously affect the parties' constitutional rights received a
cautious welcome.
While there were few, if any, constitutional challenges to summary judgment procedures at the federal level, 4 the courts were
certainly aware of the potential problem and took pains to
remain well inside constitutional boundaries. 8 Adumbrated
within the jury trial dilemma was the issue of witness credibility.
If the Constitution mandated that the jury retain its function as
the trier of fact, could a grant of summary judgment ever be constitutionally permissible if the movant's case relied on testimonial evidence? Even if the Constitution would allow summary
judgment in such cases, the question remained whether such a

of the rule." Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 479 (2d Cir. 1947). See also Richard L.
Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PrrT. L. REV. 725 (noting "judicial reluctance" to use
Rule 56).
82. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 306 (5th Cir. 1940)(providing
that Rule 56 "cannot deprive a litigant of, or at all encroach upon, his right to a jury trial.
Judges in giving its flexible provisions effect must do so with this essential limitation
constantly in mind.").
83. The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In Suits
at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved...." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. While the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the states, see Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294 (1877), almost all
state constitutions contain jury trial guarantees. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 64
at § 11.1 n. 1 (1985)(noting that only the Constitutions of Colorado, Louisiana, Utah, and
Wyoming lack constitutional guarantees of civil jury trial).
84. Wright and Miller note the dearth of constitutional challenges to Rule 56 and
attribute the lack of activity to earlier state court decisions upholding summary judgment
rules. WmGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 2714 (1995).
85. See Bauman, supra note 61 at 352 (noting the "extreme caution exercised by
courts in the application of the rule").
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grant would be advisable as a policy matter.8 6 The best known
debate on this question occurred in the high-profile Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 7 where 8Judges Frank and Clark wrote a
series of opinions on the issue.
Judge Clark championed an expansive interpretation of the
rule, arguing that summary judgment was clearly appropriate
when the motion was supported by unimpeached testimonial evidence.8 9 In his dissent in Arnstein v. Porter,90 he argued against
allowing the case to proceed to trial when the respondent's hopes
(in Clark's view) rested on "the virtues of cross-examination." 9'
Judge Frank, on the other hand, argued that when the
movant's case hinged on testimonial evidence, and hence on the
credibility of the witness giving that evidence, summary judgment should rarely, if ever, be granted. 92 In such a situation, the
case should be tried and the jury allowed to weigh the credibility
of the witnesses subject to the court's power to comment on the
evidence and, if necessary, grant a new trial. "If evidence is 'of a
kind that greatly taxes the credulity of the judge, he can say so,
or, if he totally disbelieves it, he may announce that fact, leaving
the jury free to believe it or not.' 93 To Judge Frank, the need to
have testimonial evidence presented in open court existed even
though the respondent adduced no evidence in opposition to the
motion bringing the affiant's credibility into doubt.9 4 In such a
case, demeanor becomes all important. "[I]t has been said that a
witness' demeanor is a kind of 'real evidence;' obviously such
'real evidence' cannot be included in affidavits." 95
96
Commentators, for the most part, sided with Judge Clark.
The Supreme Court never specifically addressed the issue, however decisions from the Court also certainly seemed to indicate
86. See Charles E. Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 MN. L. REV. 567, 578-579
(1952)(noting: "What is needed is the application of common sense, good judgment, and
decisive action, on the one hand, not to shut a deserving litigant from his trial.").
87. Of course, other circuits also tussled with the problem. See, e.g., United States
v. United Mkts. Assn., 291 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1961)(stating that grant of summary judgment is inappropriate where issues of credibility exist; such issues may only be resolved
at trial).
88. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
89. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 475-80.
90. 154 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1955).
91. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 478.
92. Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753, 758 (2d Cir. 1955).
93. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 469 (quoting Post v. United States, 135 F. 1, 11 (5th Cir.
1905)).
94. Subin, 224 F.2d at 758.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., David A. Sonenshein, State of Mind and Credibility in the Summary
Judgment Context: A Better Approach, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 774 (1983).
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its acceptance of Judge Clark's views.9 7 By the 1980's, few, if
any, federal courts refused to grant summary judgment when the
movant's case rested on testimonial evidence. 98 Any residual
doubts as to the correctness of this view were eliminated in 1986.
In 1986, the Supreme Court decided three cases involving the
propriety of grants of summary judgment under Rule 56. 99 The
decisions generated numerous scholarly comments, with some
disagreement as to the full implications of the Court's decisions. 10 While an in-depth discussion of the decisions is both
beyond the scope of this article and needlessly repetitious, a brief
overview of two of the decisions, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett'01 and
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 0 2 is
enlightening as the cases highlight the modern federal approach
to summary judgment.
Celotex involved a suit filed by the surviving spouse of Louis
Catrett, whose 1979 death was caused by exposure to asbestoscontaining products. 1 3 The complaint named fifteen defendants,
10 4
all of whom either manufactured or distributed the products.
After discovery, several of the defendants, including Celotex Corporation, filed motions for summary judgment. 10 5 Celotex did not
support its motion with any evidence, but simply asserted that
the plaintiff had "failed to produce evidence that any [Celotex]
product ... was the proximate cause of the injuries alleged."0 6
The district court granted the motion (as well as the motions
filed by the other defendants) and the plaintiff appealed. 0 7 The
97. Id. at 786-91.
98. Of course, no one can say with complete certainty that no federal trial court of
the 1980's would have denied a summary judgment motion because it was supported by
testimonial evidence if presented with such a situation. There seems to be no such
reported cases, however, while there are many cases in which courts granted summary
judgment motions based on testimonial evidence. See, e.g., Corrugated Paper Products,
Inc. v. Longview Fibre Co., 868 F.2d 908, 913-15 (7th Cir. 1989)(providing that it is appropriate for trial court to consider testimonial evidence in granting motion for summary
judgment); Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903, 909 (3d Cir. 1984Xstating.
"[Slummary judgment may be based on affidavits.").
99. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.. 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986).
100. Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering
View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OMo ST.
L.J. 95 (1988); Jack J. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a
Material Change in Standards?,63 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 770 (1988).
101. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
102. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
103. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 319.
104. Id.

105. Id.
106. Id. at 319-20.
107. Id. at 320.
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the trial
court's decision, finding summary judgment inappropriate
because the defendant/movant had "[m]ade no effort to adduce
any evidence, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, to support its
10 8
motion."
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, reversed the court
of appeals. 10 9 The opinion, authored by Justice Rehnquist, supported the proposition that when the summary judgment movant
will not have the burden of persuasion at trial, the filing of the
motion shifts to the respondent the burden of producing adequate evidence to demonstrate an ability to prove a prima facie
case. 110 The Court noted that "a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those
portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the
While the movant
absence of a genuine issue of material fact."'
to prove an
inability
asserted
respondent's
the
needs to expose
essential element of its case, however, the movant is clearly not
required to support the motion with affidavits or other1 evidence
2
expressly negating the existence of that essential fact.
Justice White, in an attempt to clarify the movant's burden,
authored a concurring opinion in Celotex that provided the fifth
vote in the decision. Justice White asserted that "[i]t is not
enough to move for summary judgment without supporting the
motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case.""' While Justice White's
concurrence informed the reader that a "conclusory assertion"
would be inadequate to support a defendant's motion for summary judgment, 1 4 the opinion provided no guidance on what evidentiary materials would be minimally adequate to support a
summary judgment motion filed by that party. In a dissent
joined by two other justices, Justice Brennan noted that "the
Court has not clearly explained what is required of a moving
party seeking summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party cannot prove its case.""' Justice Brennan suggested that the movant must have a burden of "affirmatively"
108.
109.
110.
111.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 322-23.
Id. at 323.

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 328.
Id.
Id. at 329.
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that there is no evidence to support the respondemonstrating
6

dent's case."

While considerable confusion still surrounds the issue of what
the burden of production is for a summary judgment movant
when that party will not carry the burden of persuasion at
trial, 11 7 Celotex makes clear what many courts had already
understood: such a movant is not required in the summary judgment motion to prove the non-existence of all possible fact scenarios that could provide the respondent with a basis for
recovery. 118 Instead, when the movant files the motion, the burden shifts to the respondent to produce evidentiary material adequate to demonstrate an ability to meet its burden of persuasion
at trial.
Matsushita, another summary judgment case decided by the
Court in 1986, announced no new doctrines regarding the grant
of summary judgment. The case is interesting, rather, for the
attitude that the Court displayed toward summary judgment: an
aggressive attitude favoring the grant of the motion whenever
possible even if such action necessitates a weighing of evidence
by the court." 9
Matsushita was an extraordinarily complex antitrust case
filed by two American companies against Japanese manufacturers of consumer electronic products ("CEPs").1 0 The plaintiffs
alleged, inter alia, that the defendants had violated antitrust
laws by engaging, over a twenty year period, in a conspiracy
designed to drive American companies out of the American market for CEPs.' 21 The conspiracy was carried out through a price
116. Id. at 331.
117. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court's New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54
BRooKLYN L. REv. 35, 42 (1988) (noting that "the implications of the Supreme Court's
newest pronouncements have not yet fully percolated into practice"). See also
Friedenthal, supra note 99 at 771 ("ultimate effect [of Supreme Court decisions] is uncertain and could prove to be limited").
118. See, e.g., Food Fair, Inc. v. Mock, 199 S.E.2d 820 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973). In Food
Fair,the plaintiff filed a "slip and fall" suit against the defendant grocery store. Id. at

820. The grocery store employees filed affidavits stating that they were not aware of any
hazardous condition existing at the time of the plaintiffs fall, and that they did not thereafter find any slippery floors in the area where the plaintiff had fallen. Id. at 821. The
court held the affidavits to be adequate to "pierce the pleadings" of the plaintiff, and
thereby shift the burden to her to come forward with evidentiary material showing that
she might be able to prove negligence at trial. Id. at 821-22. See also Fontenote v.
UpJohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1986)(holding that when defendant is summary
judgment movant, motion need not be supported by evidence disproving all elements of
plaintiffs claim).
119.

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597.

120. Id. at 577-78.
121.

Id.
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fixing arrangement pursuant to which the defendants had allegedly agreed among themselves that they would engage in predatory pricing. 122 According to the plaintiffs, the Japanese
manufacturers conspired to charge artificially high prices for
products that they sold in Japan. 'I The excess profits generated
by these artificially high prices enabled the defendants to undercut the prices of American manufacturers in the American market."
The conspirators hoped that, eventually, the American
manufacturers would be driven out of the market, and the Japa1 25
nese would be able to reap monopoly profits.
During the course of the litigation, the parties amassed a record that, at the Supreme Court, was distilled to a forty volume
appendix. 26 Included in this record were the affidavits of numerous experts in the antitrust field. 12 The defendants argued that
the behavior attributed to them by the plaintiffs was irrational. 2 8 The plaintiffs countered with expert testimony, asserting that the alleged behavior was entirely plausible given the
attitude of Japanese businesses,' 29 and eventually moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. 130
On appeal, the circuit court reversed the district court's grant
of summary judgment, in part because the district court had
erroneously excluded much of the evidence submitted in opposition to the motion.' 3 ' The appellate court felt that with the
admission of the plaintiffs' experts' affidavits, the conflicting
opinions of the expert witnesses produced a genuine issue of
32
material fact.
The Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the court of appeals and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 3 3 The Court stated
that the issue on appeal was "whether the Court of Appeals
122.

Id. at 584.

123.

Id.

124. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 584.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 577.
127. Id. The Court's opinion is replete with references to the testimony of various
experts. The dissenters place particular reliance on the report of Dr. Horace J. Depodwin,

a report that the district court had characterized as "by far the most careful,, scholarly,
and disinterested of the reports submitted by the plaintiffs' expert witnesses." Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1335 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Part
of the report had been ruled inadmissable by the district court. Id. at 1372.
128. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588.
129. Id. The plaintiffs relied, inter alia, on a report stating that the Japanese
defendants were "engaged in a generally collusive scheme embracing the Japanese
domestic market as well." Id. at 602 n.2.
130. Id. at 579.
131. Id. at 580.
132. Id.
133. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 598.
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applied the proper standard in evaluating the District Court's
decision to grant petitioners' motion for summary judgment."31 4
In analyzing the issue, the Court first reiterated the standards
set forth in Rule 56 for a grant of summary judgment: the
movant must demonstrate a lack of a "genuine" issue of material
fact and must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 135 Once
the movant has produced evidence meeting these standards, the
burden shifts to the respondent to "come forward with 'specific
facts' showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' 36 The
Court then went on to say that if the "factual context renders
respondents' claim implausible . . . [they] must come forward
with more persuasive evidence... than would otherwise be necessary." 37 Read literally and out of context, this statement can
be interpreted as nothing more than a restatement of existing
summary judgment law. While the Court obviously meant to
authorize some weighing of the conflicting evidence submitted on
the summary judgment motion, many courts had engaged in that
practice for some time. 38 Judge Clark would certainly agree
that some weighing of the evidence is proper in the summary
judgment setting. The respondent must produce more than a
"scintilla" of evidence in opposition to the motion.
The Court went on to hold, however, that even though it used
this standard, the court of appeals had erred in determining that
there was a genuine issue of material fact because it "failed to
consider the absence of a plausible motive to engage in predatory
pricing." 39 The Court extensively examined not only the record
before it, but also the literature relating to predatory pricing
schemes to ascertain whether the defendants lacked a "plausible
motive" for a price fixing conspiracy.' 4° After its examination,
the Court concluded that the alleged price fixing scheme was economically irrational and the plaintiffs' experts were simply
wrong in concluding that the defendants might have behaved in
the manner alleged by the plaintiffs.' 4 ' The Court therefore held
improper, and
that the denial of summary judgment was
1 42
consideration.
further
for
case
the
remanded
134. Id. at 582.
135. Id. at 587.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Letson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 1221 (D.C. Ga.
1981)(providing that respondent must produce "significant probative evidence" to defeat
motion for summary judgment).
139. Matsushita,475 U.S. at 595.
140. Id. at 589-91.
141. Id. at 594-95.
142. Id. at 598.
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The remarkable aspect of Matsushita is not so much the standard used by the Court, but the manner in which it was applied.
While the Court did not grant summary judgment, it clearly
encouraged the lower court to be more aggressive in weighing the
evidence presented on the motion. 14 The Court suggested that a
grant of summary judgment is appropriate where the evidence
produced by the respondent raises only a "metaphysical
doubt."1' Thus, while the opinion does not produce any doctrinal
changes in federal summary judgment practice, it indicates an
increasing willingness by the federal courts to weigh the evidence and grant summary judgment in cases where one side's
evidence is weak.
Although ten years have passed since Matsushita and Celotex,
the ramifications of these decisions are still unclear. While the
decisions do not explicitly permit federal courts to make credibility determinations based on the strength of opposing affidavits,
they may be read to implicitly grant such authority. If a judge is
permitted to grant summary judgment when the evidence produced by the respondent is "unlikely," the potential exists for
some federal tribunals to grant summary judgment when it
appears that the respondent will have difficulty impeaching the
testimonial evidence offered by the movant in support of the
motion.

45

A grant of summary judgment when the respondent

has produced no evidence in opposition to a motion supported by
testimonial evidence is even more likely.
Many states have used the federal rules as a model when
crafting their own rules of civil procedure.146 The federal courts'
interpretation of the federal rules carries great weight in those
1 47
states engaged in such crafting.

The Supreme Court's encouragement of federal courts to be
more aggressive in granting summary judgment motions is
almost certain to trickle down to the state level. This "trickle
down" effect of Matsushita and other summary judgment deci143. Id. at 597-98.
144. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586.
145. Most federal courts, if not all, still insist that summary judgment is inappropriate when the parties submit contradictory affidavits. See Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d
21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992)(providing that "summary judgment is not a procedure for resolving
a swearing contest."). Other courts have read Matsushita, however, as imposing a
requirement on the respondent to place on the record direct evidence that would put the
credibility of the movant's witnesses in issue. See Rand v. CF Industries, Inc., 42 F.3d
1139 (7th Cir. 1994)(noting that respondent is required to produce "specific facts" placing
credibility of movant's witnesses in issue).
146. FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.7 (3d ed.
1985)(citing CHARLES ALAN WmGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 62 (4th ed. 1983)).
147. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 62 (4th ed. 1983).
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sions of the Supreme Court is particularly likely in light of the
continued perception of court dockets as being overcrowded with
frivolous litigation and a belief that summary judgment is the
best available procedure to ease this congestion.
While some individual states, such as Pennsylvania, are certainly at liberty to remain aloof from the federal summary judgment trend, they should not do so unless there are strong policy
reasons to follow a different course. 148 The remainder of this article analyzes the historical basis of Pennsylvania's summary
judgment jurisprudence and examines the current policy considerations behind that jurisprudence.
III.

PENNSYLVANIA SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Although summary judgment is a relatively recent procedural
development in Pennsylvania, 1 49 its historical antecedents
existed at least as early as the eighteenth century. 150 Furthermore, many characteristics of those antecedents survive in the
present-day courts' interpretation and application of summary
judgment.''
Pennsylvania was typical of most colonial jurisdictions in
adopting the English practice of allowing plaintiffs to secure
judgments in cases when the defendant did not plead a bona fide
defense. 5 2 The first post-revolutionary use of the practice
appears to have resulted from an agreement between members of
the Supreme Court bar, in which the members agreed to confess
judgment against defendants in cases where they represented
plaintiffs unless the defendants filed affidavits of defense. 1 53 By
its terms, the agreement applied to all types of cases and not only
to those based on debt or contract. 5 4 Thus, it expanded the
reach of the English practice.
148. See Orme School v. Reeves, 802 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Ariz. 1990)(providing- "uniformity in interpretation of [state] rules and federal rules is highly desirable").
149. In Pennsylvania, the motion for summary judgment was first established in
1966. The Pennsylvania Procedural Civil Rules Committee had considered adoption of a
summary judgment procedure in 1946, but elected not to enact such a rule in part
because of its perception that the procedure was not needed in the state system, where
there is a predominance of smaller amounts in controversy. 3 GOODRICH-AMRAM 2D
§ 1035:2 (1991).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the English
practice of permitting plaintiffs to obtain judgment without trial when the defendant
raised a "sham defense."
153. The agreement is reprinted in Detmold & Cox v. Gate Vein Coal Co., 3 W.N.C.
567 (D.C. Pa. 1876).
154. See id.
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Similar agreements were later adopted by, other courts. In
1809, the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court promulgated a rule
requiring defendants to file affidavits of defense only in cases
involving a debt or contract, returning the rule to its original
English application. 1- 5 The rule also created a subtle change in
summary judgment practice, as it placed the burden on the
defendant to swear that there was a valid defense to the action,
instead of on the plaintiff to come forward with a sworn document stating that the defense was groundless. The allegations
required to be in the defendant's affidavit were conclusory in
nature, as the defendant was not required to state either the
basis of the defense or the facts upon which the defense was
grounded. No documents supporting the defense were required
in addition to the affidavit, and there was no procedural mechanism available to the plaintiff to attack the affidavit. Possibly
the greatest difference between the affidavit of defense and a typical common law pleading was that the defendant had to make
156
the affidavit of defense under oath.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court approved the use of the affidavit of defense in the 1811 case of Vanatta v. Anderson. 5 7 In
Vanatta, the defendant attacked the affidavit of defense rule on
the basis that the rule could, in some instances, deprive a defendant of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial. 158 The
defendant argued that the Pennsylvania Constitution forbade
the establishment of any judicial procedures limiting access to a
trial by jury. ' 9 Since the affidavit of defense rule was adopted
after the enactment of the Constitution and required defendants
155.

The rule provided as follows:
It is ordered that in all actions brought or to be brought in this court, of
debt or contract, the plaintiff shall be at liberty to direct judgment of course to be
entered at the third term, unless the defendant or some person for him or her, shall
make affidavit and previously file the same in the clerk's office, that to the best of
his or her knowledge and belief there is a just defence in the said cause.
Quoted in Vanatta v. Anderson, 3 Binn. 417, 417 (Pa. 1811).
156. While this may not seem to be a great distinction to modern practitioners
accustomed to verified pleadings, the requirement that a pleading be made under oath
was considered novel, if not onerous, to early nineteenth century lawyers. The attorney
for the defendant in Vanatta wrote of the requirement: "It is a snare for the consciences
of men. Where you sow oaths, you reap perjuries." Vanatta, 3 Binn. at 419.
157. 3 Binn. 417 (1811).
158. Vanatta, 3 Binn. at 481. Vanatta involved a two pronged attack on the rule.
The defendant's first argument was that the rule was unconstitutional because it
deprived him of a right to a jury trial. Id. The second argument, that the courts of common pleas lacked the power to promulgate such a rule, received more serious attention
from the court although the court eventually decided that the Pennsylvania trial courts
were invested with such power. Id. at 424.
159. Id. at 418.
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to swear to the validity of a defense as a prerequisite to a jury
160
trial, the defendant urged that the rule was unconstitutional.
The court did not find the defendant's argument persuasive,
analogizing the affidavit of defense rule to the common law
requirement that a dilatory plea must be made under oath to
preserve the right to jury trial. 16 Since the requirement that
certain defenses be made under oath predated the enactment of
the Constitution, the court found the slight expansion of the
by the Philadelphia rule to be constitutionrequirement created
162
ally permissible.
After Vanatta diminished the constitutional concerns surrounding the affidavit of defense procedure, the use of this practice spread. By 1835, the Pennsylvania Legislature, in
establishing the District Court for the County of Philadelphia,
required that affidavits of defense filed in that court state the
"nature and character" of the defense. 63 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court later construed this rule to require that defendto
ants plead a defense with some reference to facts in 1order
64
defense.
the
of
nature
the
ascertain
to
plaintiffs
enable
This requirement gave plaintiffs in contract actions a new
weapon. Not only could they obtain judgment without trial in
cases where the defendant failed to file an affidavit of defense,
but they could also avoid trial by arguing that the affidavit was
insufficient because it failed to set forth a legal defense. While
plaintiffs were forced to accept the facts stated in an affidavit of
defense as true (the procedure provided no means of attacking
the sufficiency of a defendant's evidence), they were able to
attack the legal sufficiency of the defense asserted in the affidavit. Thus, by 1835, Pennsylvania procedure provided a primitive
means of "piercing the pleadings."
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, Pennsylvania
courts were repeatedly confronted with the question of whether
an affidavit of defense was alone sufficient to require the underlying legal dispute to be resolved through plenary trial. 166 In virtually all cases, courts focused on the legal sufficiency of the
proposed defense and accepted the facts stated in the affidavit as
160. Id. at 418-19.
161. Id. at 422.
162. Id. at 422-23.
163. Act of March 28, 1835, Pa. Pub. L. No. 63.
164. See West v. Simmons, 2 Wharton 261, 265 (Pa. 1837). In its opinion, the court
noted that only "[h]is own affidavit, or that of others conusant of facts, disclosing any
ground of defense in matter of fact, entitles him to a trial by jury in the usual manner."
Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
165. See Mellor v. Negley, 1 Pitts. 110 (Allegheny Co. 1854); Potter v. Price, 3 Pitts.
136 (Allegheny Co. 1869); Bentzel v. Pfalzgraff, 1 York 202 (York Co. 1880).
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true.'6 6 Credibility and sufficiency of evidence were simply not
issues before the courts. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, some courts began to use language indicating that
a plaintiff might successfully move for summary judgment if the
defendant's affidavit failed to set forth facts necessary to prove
the alleged defense. 1 67 There are, however, no reported cases in
which a court granted summary judgment because an affidavit of
defense failed to set forth an adequate factual basis for the
defense.
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, courts began
to use the phrase "summary judgment" to refer to the judgment
that plaintiffs could obtain in cases where defendants either filed
68
no affidavit of defense or an insufficient affidavit of defense.
While the term "summary judgment" is familiar today, the procedure that was being described was markedly different than the
modern summary judgment procedure. The process was not
available to defendants, and plaintiffs did not need to submit any
evidence in support of the motion. 69 Furthermore, the summary
judgment rule was categorical in scope: affidavits of defense
were only required in actions sounding in debt or assumpsit,
70
where the proof was frequently documentary in nature.
Summary judgment began its gradual expansion into a transsubstantive procedure in 1887. In that year, the Pennsylvania
legislature enacted a new summary judgment practice act 171 that
combined the actions of debt, assumpsit and covenant into one
166. See Noble v. Kreuzkamp, 2 A. 419 (Pa. 1885) (noting that court "must assume"
facts set out in affidavit of defense are true).
167. See, e.g., Andrews v. Blue Ridge Packing Co., 55 A. 1059 (Pa. 1903)(stating: "An
affidavit of defense should set forth fully and fairly facts sufficient to show prima facie a
good defense, and if it fails to do so, either from omission of essential facts or manifest
evasiveness in the mode of statement, it will be insufficient to prevent judgment.")(emphasis added).
168. See, e.g., Byrne v. Hayden, 16 A. 750, 753 (Pa. 1889)(stating: "the affidavit of
defense is sufficient to prevent a summary judgment for plaintiff"). This seems to be one
of the earliest uses of this phrase in Pennsylvania jurisprudence.
169. See, e.g., Knerr v. Bradley, 105 Pa. 190 (1889). In Knerr, the plaintiff filed a
statement of claim accompanied by a copy of the lease on which the claim was founded.
Id. at 191. The defendant filed an affidavit of defense alleging that the plaintiffs copy of
the lease was "incomplete and inaccurate." Id. at 192. The plaintiff moved for judgment
for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense. Id. at 191. The court refused to grant the
motion, noting that "[als the question here presented is upon the sufficiency of the affidavit, we must assume that all its material averments are true." Id. at 193. See also Fritz
v. Hathway, 19 A. 1011, 1012 (Pa. 1890)(noting: "A judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense is, in effect, a judgment on demurrer, and, like all such judgments, must
be self-sustaining on the face of the record.").
170. See Osborn v. First Nat. Bank, 26 A. 289 (Pa. 1893)(noting that even after Act
of 1887, affidavit of defense was only required in actions based on contracts or other written instruments).
171. Act of May 25, 1887, Pa. Pub. L. No. 158.
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action known as an action in assumpsit. The Act further provided that "[i]n the action of assumpsit, judgment may be moved
for want of an affidavit of defense, or for want of a sufficient affidavit .. in accordance with the present practice in actions of
debt and assumpsit. " 172 While this legislation did not introduce
any sweeping changes in Pennsylvania practice, it did require a
plaintiffs statement of claim to be accompanied by "all notes,
contracts, book entries ... upon which the plaintiffs claim is
founded ....

,,17' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in constru-

ing this language, stated:
The plain inference from the language of both sections is that it
was the intention of the legislature to limit this remedy to causes of
action which were either actually in writing or contracts the whole
details of which could be plainly set down in writing, with particular
terms and limitations, so that a liability
for the payment of a definite
174
sum of money could be expressed.
This nascent summary judgment procedure existed only in cases
where documentary proof was likely to be found and where the
plaintiff was required to provide that documentary evidence.
From 1887 to 1947, the affidavit of defense remained in common usage in Pennsylvania pleading with little change. 1 75 In
1915, however, the legislature enacted the "Practice Act,
nineteen fifteen," 176 which created significant changes in other
areas of Pennsylvania practice. This act extended the requirement of filing the affidavit of defense to all actions in trespass
and assumpsit, excepting only libel and slander actions.177 While

extending this filing requirement to actions in trespass may
seem significant, the legislation placed restrictions on its use in

this area as it only required a defendant in trespass actions to
deny certain allegations relating to ownership, agency and the

172.
173.

Id. § 5.
Id. § 3.

174. Corry v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 45 A. 341, 342 (Pa. 1900).
175. In 1901, the legislature required the filing of an affidavit of defense in actions
in replevin. Act of April 19, 1901, Pa. Pub. L. No. 61. The plaintiff in such actions was
also required to verify the statement of claim. Id.
176. Act of May 14, 1915, Pa. Pub. L. No. 202.
177. Id. While the Practice Act required a defendant in a trespass action to file an
affidavit of defense, Pa. Pub. L. No. 202 § 13, the Act did not permit a plaintiff to obtain
summary judgment if a defendant failed to comply with the requirement. See Wilson v.
Adams Express Co., 72 Pa. Super. Ct. 384, 389 (1919)(noting that: "There is no provision
made for a summary judgment for the failure to file such an affidavit").
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like. 178 All other allegations were "deemed to be put in issue

unless expressly admitted."179
The affidavit of defense continued in use until 1947, when it
was replaced by responsive documents such as the answer and
preliminary objections. 80 Pennsylvania did not, however, promulgate a rule allowing the filing of a motion for summary judgment until 1966, almost thirty years after the promulgation of
the federal rule. Interpretation of the summary judgment rule
adopted in 1966 has been affected in several ways by its procedural history.
First, the procedural progenitor of the motion for summary
judgment, the affidavit of defense, had traditionally been avail18 1
able only in cases where the plaintiffs proof was documentary.
Originally a plaintiffs weapon, the motion for judgment based on
an insufficient (or no) affidavit of defense could only be used, at
least after 1835, in actions sounding in contract or debt. 182 Furthermore, plaintiffs in these cases were required to file all documents necessary to prove their cases with their statement of
claim.18 3 Cases in which the proof often consisted principally of
testimony, such as actions sounding in trespass, were not covered by the affidavit of defense rule prior to 1915.184 Even after
1915, the affidavit of defense rule had only limited applicability
178. Act of May 14, 1915, Pa. Pub. L. No. 202 § 13. In this regard, the Act provided:
"the averments... of the person by whom the act was committed, the agency or employment of such person, the ownership or possession of the vehicle, machinery, property or
instrumentality involved, and all similar averment, if not denied, shall be taken to be
admitted .... ." Id.
179. Id. The averments that a defendant was required to specifically deny in order
to put allegations at issue are interesting. Many of the averments relate to facts that
might be difficult for the plaintiff to prove. For instance, in many cases, the plaintiff
would have difficulty proving that an individual was acting as an employee of the defendant at the time an accident occurred as the evidence on that point would, in all
probability, be within the control of the defendant. The effect of the rule was to actually
relieve a plaintiff from having to prove those matters.
180. Rule 1017, limiting pleadings to a complaint, answer, reply, counter-reply, preliminary objection and answer thereto was adopted on June 25, 1946 and became effective
on January 1, 1947. PA. R. Crv. P. 1017.
181. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
182. See Borlin v. Commonwealth ex rel Hillis (Pa. 1881)(providing that "these...
rules . . . have always been limited to obligations and contracts for the payment of
money").
183. Act of March 28, 1835, Pa. Pub. L. No. 63 § 2. The Act provided that: "no judgment shall be entered... unless the said plaintiff shall.., file in the office of the prothonotary ... a copy of the instrument of writing, book entries, record or claim, on which
action has been brought." Id.
184. See Corry v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 194 Pa. 516, 520 (1900)(stating that "we
think an examination of the act of 1887 clearly shows that it was the intent of the legislature to confine the remedy by judgment for want of an affidavit of defense to actions ex
contractu alone.., and not to extend this remedy to actions ex delicto .... ).
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to trespass actions. 18 5 Thus, a long tradition developed among
Pennsylvania jurists to allow motions for summary judgment
only in instances where a plaintiff could prove its case by documentary evidence. While nothing in the language of either the
original Pennsylvania rule governing summary judgment' or
the new rules governing summary judgment 187 distinguishes
between testimonial and documentary evidence, the embedded
historical preference for documentary evidence continues in
practice.
Second, the affidavit of defense rule never allowed either party
to use additional materials in support of or in opposition to the
affidavit.' 8 8 As a result, Pennsylvania courts never developed a
body of law with respect to issues of credibility in the summary
judgment setting. Plaintiffs were forced to accept the allegations
contained in the affidavit of defense as true. 89 The courts generally addressed only the legal sufficiency of the defense presented
in the affidavit. 190 While some courts may have suggested that
the plaintiff might have successfully attacked bona fides of the
affidavit, 19 ' there were no reported cases in which such an attack
actually occurred. Thus, in 1966, when Pennsylvania adopted a
rule governing motions for summary judgment allowing evidence
extraneous to the pleadings to support the motion, the jurisprudence that had developed with the affidavit of defense procedure
provided little guidance as to issues of credibility or sufficiency of
the evidence. For direction on these issues, Pennsylvania
courts
92
had to look to decisions from directed verdict cases.
The directed verdict had been a doctrine with trans-substantive application almost from its inception, and thus it naturally
fit in with the trans-substantive summary judgment procedure.
In early Pennsylvania cases, the standard for granting a motion
185. See supra note 175.
186. PA. R. Crv. P. 1035 (rescinded 1996).
187. PA. R. Crv. P. 1035.1-1035.5.
188. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
189. See Young v. Miller, 34 A. 210, 210 (Pa. 1896)(providing- "Affidavits procured
...could not be resorted to for the purpose of disproving or nullifying the averments
[contained in the affidavit of defense]. On that question of fact defendant was entitled to
a trial by jury."). See also Morrison v. Shearman, 46 A. 1030 (Pa. 1900).
190. See Andrews v. Blue Ridge Packing Co., 55 A. 1059 (Pa. 1903).
191. See supra note 165.
192. In many jurisdictions, the legal standard for the directed verdict differs from
the legal standard for summary judgment. See Stempel, supra note 99. The two motions
produce such similar effects that similar standards, if not identical, are probably well
advised. The drafters of neither the Pennsylvania nor the federal summary judgment
rule, however, have mandated such a result. Pennsylvania courts have clearly stated,
though, that the legal standards, at least with respect to the sufficiency of evidence, are
identical for the two motions.
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for directed verdict was that the non-moving party had to produce any evidence on which the jury could base a verdict in that
party's favor. 1 93 Although Pennsylvania courts employed somewhat different terminology, this standard seems to have been
virtually identical to the now disfavored "scintilla" standard,1 9 4
and its use undoubtedly kept the number of directed verdicts
low.
During the first half of the nineteenth century, Pennsylvania
courts did not concern themselves with the credibility of the
movant's witnesses' 95 in assessing whether a respondent's evidence was adequate to prevent the entry of a directed verdict.
Nothing in these early decisions indicates that a case needed to
be submitted to the jury solely because the plaintiffs case had
been proved through testimonial evidence, and directed verdicts
appear to have in fact been granted in cases involving proof by
testimony.

19 6

Early in the second half of the nineteenth century, however,
Pennsylvania courts joined a nationwide trend of allowing parties to lawsuits to testify on their own behalf, 197 and almost
immediately issues of credibility came to the forefront. Courts
began to hold that questions of credibility were jury matters and
that directed verdicts could not be granted in cases where the
proof was testimonial in nature. 98 By 1871, the Pennsylvania
193. See, e.g., Repsher v. Wattson, 17 Pa. 365, 369 (1851)(noting: "Itis not our business to say whether the evidence of negligence was sufficient to call for the verdict which
was rendered. There was, however, some which the court could not lawfully prevent the
jury from passing upon.") (emphasis in original).
194. The "scintilla" standard was formerly used by many courts in deciding motions
for directed verdicts. Under this standard, the respondent only needed to produce a "scintilla" of evidence in opposition to such a motion in order to defeat it. See, e.g., Huff v.
Vulcan Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 206 So. 2d 861 (Ala. 1956). The rule has been abandoned in
most jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. See Howard Express Co. v. Wile, 64 Pa. 201,
205 (1870)(noting that the doctrine "has not stood the test of experience"); but see
Ritmanich v. Jonnel Enterprises, 280 A.2d 570 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971)(noting that testimonial evidence provides the "required scintilla" necessary to place fact in dispute). In place
of the "scintilla" standard, most jurisdictions now require the introduction of "substantial" evidence to support a verdict from a "reasonable"jury. See Edward H. Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 MIN. L. REV. 903, 921
(1971).
195. Only one reported Pennsylvania decision before 1863 explicitly states that the
direction of a verdict is improper because the assessment of credibility is the exclusive
domain of the jury. See Bank v. Donaldson, 6 Pa. 169 (1847). In Bank, the court noted
that "the jury were to judge of the credibility of the witnesses, and might possibly have
disbelieved every word of their testimony . . . ." Id. at 186.
196. See, e.g., Koons v. Steele, 19 Pa. 203 (1852). Determining whether oral evidence was used to prove a claim is somewhat difficult as the courts did not often provide a
full recitation of the evidence presented at the trial level in early decisions.
197. Act of April 15, 1869, Pa. Pub. L. No. 31 § 1.
198. See, e.g., Reel v. Elder, 62 Pa. 308 (1869)(holding that even uncontradicted oral
testimony could not support granting of directed verdict).
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Supreme Court was able to state "that since the Act of 1869,
making parties witnesses in their own causes, their credibility
has become a question of great importance in settling controversies ...

and a jury must determine their relative credibility to

arrive at a verdict." 199
Although credibility of the parties themselves had clearly
become a matter for the jury, there remained some residual
doubt as to the need for the jury to make credibility determinations as to the testimony of disinterested witnesses. °° Some
decisions implied that a directed verdict could be granted in
favor of a party whose case was based on the uncontradicted testimony of third parties;201 however, the distinction between the
two types of testimonial evidence never became firmly rooted in
Pennsylvania law. When the Supreme Court decided NantyG1o 20 2 in 1923, it simply ignored, or inadvertently disregarded,

the fact that the plaintiff at least partly proved his case by the

20 3
testimony of an adverse party.

Reported Pennsylvania decisions on directed verdicts make
clear that Pennsylvania courts have always been extremely
reluctant to grant the motion. The state was among the last to
recognize the directed verdict as a legitimate procedural
device,20 4 and while other states have liberalized the standards
for granting directed verdicts, Pennsylvania courts continue to.
give extreme deference to the jury as the ultimate finder of fact.
In many senses, summary judgment practice in Pennsylvania
is the product of the confluence of two procedures. The first, the
affidavit of defense, provided summary judgment practice with a
preference for situations involving documentary evidence. The
second, the directed verdict, infused summary judgment with a
strong preference for submitting factual issues to the jury, espe199. Lamb v. Irwin, 69 Pa. 436, 442 (1871).
200. See Lonzer v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 46 A. 937 (Pa. 1900), where the court
stated: "When the testimony is not in itself improbable, is not at variance with any
proved or admitted facts, or with ordinary experience, and comes from witnesses whose
candor there is no apparent ground for doubting, the jury is not at liberty to indulge in a
capricious disbelief." Id. at 938. The court felt obliged to clarify this statement eleven
years later, stating "[bly 'candor' the learned justice who wrote the opinion unquestionably meant 'credibility,' and the credibility of a witness is always more or less affected by
his interest in the matter in controversy." Second Nat'l. Bank of Pittsburgh v. Hoffman,
78 A. 1002, 1004 (Pa. 1911).
201. See Lanzer, 46 A. at n.199.
202. Borough of Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co., 163 A. 523 (1932).
203. The Borough's case rested, at least in part, on the testimony of the tax collector
who had been joined as an additional defendant after the commencement of the suit.

204. See ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 304-05 (1952)(noting that early Pennsylvania cases did not recognize
directed verdict).
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cially questions of credibility. Combined, both procedures created an atmosphere in which courts ruling on summary
judgment motions exhibit excessive reluctance to enter judgment
without plenary court proceedings, and in which courts will
grant such motions only in cases where the proof is documentary.
This history provides an explanation for the evolution of summary judgment practice in Pennsylvania. At the same time, this
history should not prevent Pennsylvania courts from recognizing
the weaknesses of the present jurisprudence and responding
accordingly.
A.

Present Summary Judgment Standards

From 1966 until 1996, Rule 1035 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Civil Procedure governed the procedure for summary judgment
motions in Pennsylvania. As is true of almost every other summary judgment rule in the United States, Pennsylvania's rule
was modeled after the federal summary judgment rule, Rule 56.
In fact, Rule 1035 was a virtual verbatim copy of the federal rule,
the differences being both minor and unimportant for purposes of
this article. °6
Although Pennsylvania courts decided soon after Rule 1035
was promulgated that state courts should look to federal law
under Rule 56 when interpreting Rule 1035,206 Pennsylvania
summary judgment practice has continually diverged from the
federal practice. The federal courts have almost continually
expanded the availability of summary judgment, with this trend
culminating in the Supreme Court's trilogy of summary judgment decisions in 1986.207 To the contrary, Pennsylvania courts'
interpretation of the rule has undergone little change since its
promulgation.
205.

The operative language of rule 1035 provided, inter alia:
(b) ... The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issues of liability alone although
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
PA. R. Crv. P. 1035(rescinded 1996).
The corresponding section of the federal rule, Rule 56(c), is virtually identical,
containing only an additional sentence relating to the timing of the motion. See FED. R.
Crv. P. 56(c).
206. Shortly after Pennsylvania's summary judgment rule took effect, the superior
court noted that the federal courts' summary judgment decisions should be used to guide
Pennsylvania courts in their interpretation of the new rule. Schacter v. Albert, 230 A.2d
841 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968).
207. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986).
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The promulgation of Rule 1035 radically changed summary
judgment practice in Pennsylvania. Substantive restrictions on
the motion were removed. Instead of being limited to actions
sounding in debt or contract, the motion became available in virtually all civil actions, including those where motive, intent and
state of mind were at issue.2 °8 This change expanded the procedure's domain from actions where the proof usually consisted
entirely of documentary evidence, to actions where the proof may
even include substantial testimonial evidence.
Unlike the bare-bones summary judgment procedure of the
nineteenth century that consisted of an affidavit of defense and a
motion testing the legal sufficiency of the asserted defense, Rule
1035 provided for a summary judgment procedure by which a
court could preview virtually all of the evidence that the parties
might present at trial. 20 9 Rule 1035 allowed the summary judgment motion to be supported by every bit of evidence that would
be adduced at trial, except for the actual in-court testimony of
witnesses. 210 The effect of this change made the procedure far
less "summary" than it had been during the nineteenth century.
Finally, Rule 1035 removed the nineteenth century rule's
restriction on summary judgment to a plaintiffs motion. 211 The
procedure became available to all parties, including the defendant, regardless of who would carry the burden of persuasion at
trial. 212 Furthermore, the standard for summary judgment
would be the same regardless of whether the moving party or
respondent would have the burden of proof at trial. 213 214 To
some degree, use of the same standard for both the movant who
will bear the burden of proof at trial and the movant who will not
makes sense. In both instances, the motion for summary judgment (and supporting documents) should demonstrate the lack of
a genuine issue of material fact. Nonetheless, the failure of the
rule to describe the means by which the party who will not bear
the burden of proof at trial should demonstrate the absence of a
208. See PA. R. Crv. P. 1035(A) (rescinded 1996), which provided: "After the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment...." Id.
209. Former Rule 1035(a) permitted the use of"the pleadings and any depositions,
answers to interrogatories, admissions on file and supporting affidavits." PA. R. Crv. P.
1035(a)(rescinded 1996).
210. See id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Community Medical Services of Clearfield, Inc. v. Local 2665, 437 A.2d 23, 26
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1981Xciting Nader v. deToledano, 408 A.2d 31 (D.C. App. 1978)).
214. Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 412 A.2d 466, 486-89 (Pa. 1979)(providing
that "moving party has the burden of proving the nonexistence of any genuine issue of
fact").
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genuine issue of material fact caused confusion in many
courts. 21" The problem is particularly acute in Pennsylvania
because of the perceived interplay between the burden placed on
the summary judgment movant who will not bear the burden of
persuasion at trial and the restrictions imposed on summary
judgment by the Nanty-Glo rule.
One would suspect that when the party moving for summary
judgment will not bear the burden of persuasion at trial, this
party would not need to "prove" the existence of any material
facts. This is a logical assumption since the movant in such a
situation would not need to prove any material facts at trial.
Instead, the movant could simply await the presentation of the
burdened party's evidence, and if that evidence failed to prove a
material fact, move for a directed verdict. That motion should
then be granted, and issues regarding the credibility of the
movant's witnesses would never arise, particularly if the moving
party has not called any witnesses. Even if the party moving for
the directed verdict has called witnesses, their credibility should
not be an issue if the party with the burden of persuasion has
failed to carry that burden through its own evidence. This result
should be obtained even if the witnesses called by the party without the burden of persuasion are disbelieved. The party with the
burden of persuasion can only carry that burden through the production of affirmative evidence.21 6
There seems to be no valid reason why this same logic should
not prevail in the summary judgment context. If the party moving for summary judgment will not bear the burden of persuasion
at trial, he or she should not be required to produce evidence to
support a motion for summary judgment. If the movant does
produce evidence in support of the motion, even testimonial evidence, the motion should still be decided based on the evidence
provided by the party with the burden of persuasion, the respondent. If the respondent fails to produce any evidence in opposition to the motion, then the credibility of the movant's witnesses
215. This confusion also exists in the federal system despite (or perhaps because of)
the Supreme Court's Celotex decision.
216. Although no reported Pennsylvania case explicitly accepts this proposition,
there is virtual unanimity among the courts that have addressed the issue that a fact
finder may not base its finding of fact on disbelief of a witness. The party with the burden
of proof must introduce affirmative evidence to sustain its burden. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984). But see, Fleming
James, Jr., Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury-ControlDevices Available Before Verdict,
47 U. VA. L. REv. 218, 224 (1961). Professor James generally accepts the rule, but notes
that "demeanor evidence 'may satisfy the tribunal, not only that the witness' testimony is
not true, but that the truth is the opposite of his story.'" Id. (citing Dyer v. MacDougall,
201 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1952)).
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should not concern the court. This logical approach, however,
has not always prevailed in the Pennsylvania courts. Under
these circumstances, Pennsylvania courts have reached inconsistent results, sometimes granting the motion,217 while at other
times citing the Nanty-Glo doctrine as a basis for denying the
motion. 218 Godlewski v. Pars Mfg. Co. 2 19 is typical of the cases

where a Pennsylvania court denied such a summary judgment
motion.
In Godlewski, a former employee of Foster-Wheeler Energy
Corporation, together with his wife, filed an action against several manufacturers and distributors of asbestos-containing products. 220 The employee alleged that he had been injured by long-

term job exposure to the asbestos-containing products, which
were either manufactured or distributed by the defendants. 22 '
Following discovery, several of the defendants moved for summary judgment.222 One of the defendants, Pars Manufacturing
Company, based its motion on the assertion that the employee
would be unable to prove that Pars sold asbestos-containing
products to Foster-Wheeler during the time that the employee
worked with the company. 223 The only evidence that Pars submitted in support of its motion was the affidavit of its former
chairman and chief executive officer.224 The Godlewski decision
does not reveal whether the employee produced any evidence in
opposition to the motion.
The trial court granted Pars' motion, prompting an appeal by
the employee. The superior court reversed the trial court and
held that "since Pars relied solely on an affidavit of a witness to
demonstrate... Godlewski's inability to establish an element of
their causes of action, the trial court erroneously entered judgment on its motions." 225 The court stated that granting summary

judgment in such a situation is inappropriate "due to the factual
217. See, e.g., Brophy v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 422 A.2d 625 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1980).
218. See, e.g., Peluso v. Walter, 483 A.2d 905 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Skowronski v.
Bailey, 478 A.2d 1362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Godlewski v. Pars Mfg. Co., 597 A.2d 106
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). This situation differs from when the party with the burden of proof
has failed to plead all of the elements necessary to sustain the cause of action. Courts in
the latter situation have granted summary judgment despite the movant's use of testimonial evidence. See Ack v. Carroll Township Authority, 661 A.2d 514 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1995).
219. 597 A.2d 106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
220. Godlewski, 597 A.2d at 108.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 109.
224. Id.
225. Godlewski, 597 A.2d at 110.
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issue [the affidavit] raises concerning the credibility of its
22 6
maker."
The use of the Nanty-Glo doctrine in this situation is puzzling.
The superior court's opinion explicitly mentions the ability of a
defendant to obtain summary judgment by "pointing to materials
which indicate that the plaintiff is unable to satisfy an element of
his cause of action,"227 thus seemingly recognizing that when a
defendant files a motion for summary judgment, the burden of
production shifts to the respondent to come forward with some
evidence that it will be able to carry its evidentiary burden at
trial. Such a shift in the burden of production is entirely appropriate in the summary judgment context,2 28 particularly when
the motion is filed by the party that will not carry the burden of
persuasion at trial. Once a party has moved for summary judgment, the respondent may safely rest on his or her pleadings only
if the movant both bears the burden of persuasion on the cause of
action and if the materials submitted in support of the motion
are inadequate to prove the existence of all elements of that
cause of action.2 2 9 If the movant submits adequate evidentiary
materials to prove a prima facie case, or if the respondent and
not the movant bears the burden of persuasion on an issue, the
respondent should be required to come forward with some evidence in the form of affidavits, deposition testimony or other documents beyond the pleadings to show that there is a genuine
issue of fact regarding that issue. If the court denies the motion
without requiring the respondent to produce some material in
opposition to the motion, it is, in effect, allowing the respondent
to "rest on its pleadings."
The Godlewski result is not always reached by Pennsylvania
courts, particularly when the element of a plaintiffs case placed
in issue by the summary judgment motion involves state of mind.
If a plaintiff is required to prove the defendant's state of mind as
an element of its case, then one would expect the courts to deny a
defendant's motion for summary judgment supported only by testimonial evidence that the defendant lacks the requisite state of
mind for the same reason given by the Godlewski court: the
credibility of the affiant is a matter for the jury. Certainly, credibility is as much an issue when the defendant denies having the
226.

Id.

227. Id. at 109 (citing Eckenrod v. Gaf Corp., 544 A.2d 50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), and
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)).
228. See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of why such a
shift in the burden of production is appropriate.
229. See, e.g., Laspino v. Rizzo, 398 A.2d 1069 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979).
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required state of mind as when the defendant denies having
failed to repay a loan. Yet, this has not always been the case.
Many cases where state of mind issues have predominated
concern first amendment issues. 230 The typical case involves a
public figure who takes exception to statements regarding him or
her printed in the news media. The public figure sues the news
media for libel. In such a case, the public figure must prove that
the statements were made with "malicious intent,"23 ' i.e., that
the reporter either knew the statements to be false or had the
statements printed with reckless disregard of their falsity. A
typical case of this nature is Brophy v. Philadelphia
Newspapers.232
In Brophy, the defendant newspapers printed a story regarding the plaintiffs participation in the shooting of a youngster
who was participating in what appeared to be an attempted burglary.3m The story revealed that there was animosity between
the plaintiff and the victim's father, 3 4 and that some residents of
the area believed that the shooting was not entirely accidental.23 5
The plaintiff subsequently sued the newspaper for libel.236
After discovery, the defendant newspapers moved for summary judgment 23 7 and submitted the deposition testimony of the
reporter who wrote the story in support of their motion. 238 The
reporter stated within this testimony "that he did not write the
article with the intention of implying that the shooting was in
any way intentional." 23 9 The trial court granted the defendants'

motion.24 o
230. See, e.g., Braig v. Field Communications, 456 A.2d 1366 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)
(involving defamation action against television station); Curran v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 439 A.2d 652 (Pa. 1981) (involving libel actions against newspaper publisher).
See also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (involving defamation suit against
U.S. Senator).
231. Sullivan v. New York Times, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
232. 422 A.2d 625 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980). Brophy is typical of cases where the motion
has been granted. As noted, Pennsylvania courts have not been consistent in handling
this issue, and some have denied defendant's motions. See, e.g., Raffensberger v. Moran,
485 A.2d 447 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984Xholding that libel defendant's denial of malicious
intent could not provide adequate basis for summary judgment).
233. Brophy, 422 A.2d at 625.
234. Id. The plaintiff was the police commissioner of Pottsville, and the father of
the victim was the chief of police of that town. Id.
235. Id. at 628.
236. Id. at 627.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 630.
Brophy, 422 A.2d at 641.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 627.
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On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the
grant of summary judgment, 241 holding that based on the record
the plaintiff would not be able to prove that the defendant acted
maliciously.2 4 2 In its ruling, the court relied on both the
reporter's testimony 243 and the evidence in the record supporting
the plaintiffs case. 24 The court concluded that "[t]he record does
not disclose sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that
appellees engaged in highly unreasonable conduct constituting
an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers."245
Nowhere in the opinion did the court mention Nanty-Glo or
suggest that a jury should pass on the credibility of the reporter.
The court did suggest that "mere professions of good faith are
insufficient" to support a motion for summary judgment,2 6 but,
after making that observation, continued to examine the record
evidence supporting the plaintiffs case 24 7-a step that the
Godlewski court was unwilling to make.
The Brophy court utilized a type of analysis that all courts
should employ when faced with a summary judgment motion
filed by a party who will not have the burden of persuasion at
trial. In particular, the court properly discounted the deposition
testimony submitted by the defendant in ruling on the motion.
This action is appropriate because under the Nanty-Glo rule, the
deposition testimony could not be used to prove the non-existence
of a material fact any more than it could be used to prove the
existence of a material fact. Allowing the testimony to serve this
purpose would ignore the credibility issue raised by the use of
testimonial evidence.
The filing of a summary judgment motion by a party who will
not have the burden of persuasion at trial has a secondary effect,
however, which is one that was considered by the Brophy court
but apparently not by the Godlewski court. This effect is to shift
the burden of production to the respondent. Specifically, after
the party without the burden of persuasion moves for summary
judgment, the respondent must place some evidence on record
demonstrating its ability to carry the burden of production at
trial. A court should therefore inspect the record before it to
determine whether the nonmoving party has met the burden of
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 634.
Id.
Brophy, 422 A.2d at 633.
Id. at 634.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 633-34.
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production by producing evidence beyond the pleadings before it
grants the summary judgment motion. The court in Brophy
properly used this analysis, as it granted the defendant's summary judgment motion even though the motion was only supported by testimonial evidence since the respondent was unable
to adduce any evidence tending to prove its case. Unfortunately,
this type of analysis has seldom been employed by Pennsylvania
courts when state of mind is not in issue.
At least two plausible explanations exist for the Godlewski
decision (and others like it) beyond a misapplication of the
Nanty-Glo rule. The first explanation involves the ability of a
party to respond to a summary judgment motion by "rest[ing] on
his pleadings." The former Pennsylvania summary judgment
rule mirrored the federal rule in allowing a court to rely on the
"pleadings, affidavits, answers to depositions, and admissions on
file" in determining whether there was an issue of fact. 48 While
the rule did not specifically proscribe evidentiary hearings, such
proceedings were contrary to the purpose of the rule and any evidence adduced at such a hearing could not be considered by the
court in deciding the motion. 249 Thus, in passing on a motion for
summary judgment, the court was essentially surveying a paper
record.
Once a movant provided the court with evidence adequate to
support a finding that there was no genuine issue concerning
either the existence or non-provability of a material fact,28 ° the
248. PA. R. Civ. P. 1035 (rescinded 1996).
249. The court may, however, consider evidence introduced at other courtroom proceedings held throughout the course of the litigation. See Pa. Dutch, Inc. v. Pa. Amish,
Inc., 63 D.&C. 2d 702 (Cumberland Co. 1973) (relying on testimony provided in hearing
on preliminary injunction).

250. Whether the movant will assert the existence or non-existence of a material
fact is a function of the allocation of the burden of proof. If, at trial, the movant will bear
the burden of proof on the issue, the movant will assert the disputed material fact's existence. If the respondent will bear the burden of proof, the movant will assert the nonexistence of that fact, or, at least, the fact that the respondent will be unable to prove the
fact's existence.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986), there has been considerable confusion regarding the amount of documentation
that the party asserting the non-existence of a fact must provide to the court. Pennsylvania courts have not specifically addressed this issue. While there is no requirement
that the motion be supported by documentation, see Laspino v. Rizzo, 398 A.2d 1069 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1979), it is often in the movant's best interest to provide some support for the
motion beyond the allegations of the pleadings. In Laspino, the plaintiff filed a motion for
summary judgment without any supporting evidentiary materials, relying solely on the
allegations contained in her complaint. Id. at 1072. The defendant, in responding to the
motion, likewise looked to its answer to establish that there was a genuine issue of material fact. Id. The court noted that if the plaintiff had filed evidentiary materials with her
motion, the defendants' answer would have been inadequate to raise an issue of material
fact. Id.
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burden shifted to the respondent to file appropriate opposing documentation. In this regard, the former rule provided that:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.25 '
In construing this provision, Pennsylvania courts reached surprisingly confusing and inconsistent results regarding the effect
the court should give to the respondent's pleadings.252 The rule
clearly assigned a "bursting bubble" role to the respondent's
pleadings, however, in that if the respondent could not "rest"
upon the allegations or denials of his or her pleading, the court,
in ruling on the motion for summary judgment, should have
ignored the allegations or denials contained in those documents.
The court should have decided the motion without reference to
the pleadings, except to the extent that the allegations were beneficial to the moving party or to the extent the allegations were
not controverted. Some courts so construed the rule, and, in fact,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court seems to have definitively
interpreted the rule in this manner.253 A significant number of
courts stated in dicta, however, that the trial court must accept
as true all well-pleaded facts in the non-moving party's pleadings
and also give the non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from those allegations.254
The notion that the non-moving party might rely on its pleadings to thwart a summary judgment motion found its earliest
expression in Schacter v. Albert,255 where the court cited early
251. PA. R. Civ. P. 1035(d)(rescinded 1996).
252. Compare Mattia v. Employers Mut. Companies, 440 A.2d 616, 617 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1982) (noting that court "must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the non-moving
party's pleadings .... ")with Amabile v. Auto Kleen Car Wash, 376 A.2d 247 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1977), which provided:
[11f the non-moving party does not oppose a properly supported motion for
summary judgment with affidavits, depositions, of the like, he may not rely upon
his pleadings to controvert those facts presented by the moving parties' depositions. [Slupporting affidavits, after a motion for summary judgment, are acceptable as proof of facts. Pleadings are not.
Id. at 250.
253. See Phaffv. Gerner, 303 A.2d 826, 829 (Pa. 1973) (providing: "In considering a
motion for summary judgment under Rule 1035, a court may rely on the pleadings for
uncontroverted facts but must ignore the pleadings as to controverted facts.").
254. See French v. UPS, 547 A.2d 411 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) and the cases cited in
French.
255. 239 A.2d 841 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968).
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federal summary judgment cases to support this proposition.2 5 6
At the time Schacter was decided, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals had interpreted the federal rule to allow respondents to
rely on allegations contained in the pleadings to defeat a motion
for summary judgment. 257 Rule 56 was amended in 1963, at
least in part as a response to these decisions, by the addition of
two sentences to Rule 56(e). This change made it clear that a
respondent may not rest on his or her pleadings in opposing a
summary judgment motion. When Pennsylvania's summary
judgment rule was adopted in 1966, the new language of the federal rule was incorporated into the state rule. The Schacter
court apparently overlooked these developments, however, and
relied on outdated federal decisions.
Some Pennsylvania courts unfortunately continue to cite
Schacter as valid authority for the proposition that pleadings
may be adequate to raise factual issues in the summary judgment setting. The Godlewski court, for instance, in summarizing
the standards for summary judgment, included a statement that
"the record must be examined in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, accepting as true all well pleaded facts in its
pleadings and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom."25 8 This statement illustrates that
the court conceivably may have felt that Nanty-Glo was implicated because the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint were
adequate to raise a question of credibility. This reasoning is not
explicitly utilized by the court, however, and is still faulty.
One problem with this interpretation is that it does not comport with the objectives of summary judgment because it does not
further the mission to "pierce the pleadings." A historical purpose of summary judgment is to allow the movant to force the
hand of the non-moving party and compel the party to show his
or her proof prior to trial.25 9 Clearly this can be done only if the
non-moving party is denied the right to rely on the pleadings in
256. Schacter, 239 A.2d at 843 (citing Pittsburgh Hotels Ass'n, Inc. v. Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh, 202 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Pa. 1962), aftd 309 F.2d 186
(3d Cir. 1962), cert denied, 372 U.S. 916 (1963); Fiumara v. Texaco, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 544
(E.D. Pa.) affd 310 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1962)).
257. United States ex. rel. Kolton v. Halpern, 260 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1958). The court
in Schacter specifically relied on PittsburghHotels Ass'n Inc., 202 F. Supp. at 486.
258. Godlewski v. Pars Mfg. Co., 597 A.2d 106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (emphasis
added).
259. Friedenthal noted that [a]lthough the main purpose of summary judgment is
to avoid useless trials... the device may also be used to... better prepare for trial." See
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 4 at § 9.1, 434-35. See also 10 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE,
supra note 84 § 2712.
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opposing a summary judgment motion. Such a requirement also
furthers the rule's purpose as a vehicle for limited discovery.26 °
When a party without the burden of persuasion moves for
summary judgment, and, whether by testimonial evidence or no
evidence at all,26 1 controverts the burdened party's ability to
prove an essential element of his or her case, the burden should
shift to the respondent to produce evidence demonstrating the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. If the respondent
fails to produce such evidence, the credibility of the movant's witnesses simply becomes a non-issue.
While the new Pennsylvania summary judgment rules do not
provide the necessary clarity on this issue, they do seem to lend
support to the decisions that disregarded the non-moving party's
pleadings in summary judgment proceedings. Unlike former
Rule 1035 and the federal rule, the new rules do not catalog
materials that may be used to support a summary judgment
motion. Instead, Rule 1035.1 contains a definition of the term
"record" that is substantially similar to the former rule's catalog
of materials and includes, inter alia, the pleadings.2 62 Rule
1035.3 provides that "[t]he adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of the pleadings but must file a
response ... identifying ...(1) one or more issues of fact arising
from evidence in the record . . . or (2) evidence in the record
....263 This language, while retaining the former rule's prohibition against resting on the pleadings in support or opposition to a
summary judgment motion, may cause confusion because it specifically permits the respondent to rely on evidence in the "record." As the "record," in turn, is defined to include the pleadings,
the rules leave room for an argument that while they prohibit a
respondent from "resting on the pleadings" in response to a sum260. Limiting discovery is a less important role for summary judgment to serve in
Pennsylvania than in the federal system. The system of notice pleading used in the federal system accentuates the need for discovery. In Pennsylvania, where fact pleading
prevails and where pleadings are verified, the need for extensive discovery is less. Nonetheless, a motion for summary judgment may still perform an important function by forcing the respondent to "preview his or her evidence" prior to trial.
261. The suggestion that a defendant might force a plaintiff to produce his or her
entire case in defense of a summary judgment motion supported by no evidentiary material triggered Justice Brennan's dissent in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
While allowing a defendant to so "force the hand" of a plaintiff does create the potential
for "harassment," the burden on a plaintiff should not be too onerous as it is only necessary for the plaintiff to prove the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and not to
prove his or her case by a preponderance of the evidence. At any rate, the question of
what burden should be placed on the movant in such a situation is entirely different than
the question of whether credibility determinations should always be left to the fact finder.
262. PA. R. CIv. P. 1035.1.
263. PA. R. Crv. P. 1035.3.
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mary judgment motion, a respondent may still defeat the motion
by filing a response that does no more than bring the pleadings to
the attention of the court. The respondent could thus avoid the
burden of "previewing" its evidence for the court.
Of course, the new rules should not be construed in this manner. When a party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the court
should require that party to respond to a summary judgment
motion with more than a simple recantation of the pleadings.
Both the court and moving party deserve some preview of the
evidence that the respondent will present at trial. The reference
in the new rules to "evidence" in the record indeed recognizes
this need.2 4 Since the pleadings are not evidence, their use
65
should not satisfy the respondent's burden.
The second plausible explanation for the Godlewski decision
involves the policy question of what the appropriate burden of
production is to be placed on a summary judgment movant who
will not carry the burden of persuasion at trial. This is certainly
a reasonable concern, and one that divided the Supreme Court in
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett266 and has yet to be addressed by Pennsylvania courts. Requiring the summary judgment movant who
will not bear the burden of persuasion at trial to support his or
her motion with more than conclusory affidavits may be appropriate, and suggestions have also been made that the movant in
such a situation should at least point to specific weaknesses in
the respondent's case.26 7 Masking a concern about such matters
under the rubric of Nanty-Glo, however, does nothing to
enlighten the bar. If courts feel a need to place upon summary
judgment movants a burden to produce more than a simple
motion devoid of evidentiary support, and there are certainly
strong policy reasons to do so, 268 then this is the message that
264.

Id.

265.

A clever advocate might respond to this argument by pointing out that nothing

in the record is evidence until it is presented in court. While this is true, deposition testimony, affidavits, answers to interrogatories and other matters may be admitted into evidence following proper authentication. PA. R. Civ. P. 4005(c) (governing interrogatories);

PA. R. Civ. P. 4020 (governing depositions). The same may not be said of the pleadings.
See Buehler v. U.S. Fashion Plate Co., 112 A. 632 (Pa. 1921) (stating: "pleadings in case
determine the issues, primarily they are not evidence for any purpose").
266. 477 U.S. 317, 318 (1986).
267. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mills County, 874 P.2d 486, 498 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting
that movant "need only... point out that part of the record which supports its assertion"). See also Melissa L. Nelken, One Step Forward,Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment After Celotex, 40 HASTiNG L. J. 53, 65-69 (1988).
268. The manner in which a movant places the burdened party's ability to prove his

or her case in issue is a matter about which reasonable people may differ. Justice Brennan's suggestion in Celotex that allowing a movant to "force the hand" of the burdened
party by filing an unsupported motion for summary judgment results in the possibility of
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should be sent. Neither Godlewski nor the cases cited by that
court, however, provide any guidance as to what materials a
movant must provide to a court to effectively shift the burden.
The Godlewski court simply asserts that affidavits are insufficient for this purpose because of the "factual issue" they raise
concerning the credibility of the affiants. 6 9 In reality, there is no
such factual issue since the credibility of affiants would never be
tested at an actual trial. Finding credibility issues where none
exist, therefore, only conceals the problem.
The new summary judgment rules do somewhat clarify this
issue. Initially, the new rules make it absolutely clear that the
party who will not bear the burden of proof at trial may move for
summary judgment.2 7 0 The rules also make clear that if such a

motion is made, the respondent must identify "evidence in the
record establishing the facts essential to the cause of action
which the motion cites as not having been produced." 27 1 What is
unclear under the new rules, however, is what materials the
movant who will not bear the burden of persuasion at trial must
produce in support of the motion. Neither the rules nor the official comments give any suggestion as to what nature of materials
(if any) are appropriate. Regardless of the resolution of this
issue, the use of testimonial evidence by the movant should not
implicate Nanty-Glo.
Finally, the different results in Godlewski and Brophy might
be explained by the different standard of proof placed on the public figure plaintiff in each case. The plaintiff in Brophy was
required to prove his case with "convincing clarity" rather than
272
the standard civil burden of the preponderance of the evidence
that was utilized in Godlewski.27 s Taking this higher burden
into account when deciding a motion for summary judgment may
well be appropriate,274 and such a burden naturally increases the
movant's chance for success. What is unclear, however, is
whether the Brophy court indeed took the higher evidentiary
standard into account when ruling on the propriety of the summary judgment award.275
harassment may be well taken. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332. But see Levine, supra note 12
at 205-06.
269. Godlewski, 597 A.2d at 110.
270. PA. R. Crv. P. 1035.2(2).
271. Id. 1036.3(a)(2).
272. Brophy v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 422 A.2d 625, 629 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
273. Godlewski v. Pars Mfg. Co., 597 A.2d 106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
274. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
275. Pennsylvania courts have not articulated a single, clear statement of how a

summary judgment motion is affected by the burden of proof that the plaintiff will face at
trial. In Curran v. PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc., 395 A.2d 1342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978),
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When a summary judgment movant will bear the burden of
persuasion at trial, the analysis used when the movant would
not carry that burden cannot be employed. In such a situation,
even if the respondent filed nothing in opposition to the motion
and the court ignored the pleadings of the non-moving party, the
Pennsylvania former rule permitted entry of summary judgment
only "if appropriate."27 6 The new rules do not appear to change
this practice, as they provide that summary judgment "may" still
be entered in such a situation. 7 7 Therefore, the supporting documents filed with the motion must prove every element necessary
to entitle the moving party to judgment. Proof may take the form
of the materials included in the "record;" thus, a party may prove
the existence of a material fact by the use of affidavits, depositions or answers to interrogatories. 2 7 These forms of testimonial
evidence standing alone, however, have never before supported a
grant of summary judgment as the Pennsylvania courts' have
continually adhered to the Nanty-Glo rule. The courts have
believed that testimonial evidence may only form the basis for a
judgment after the witness has appeared in open court and provided the fact finder with an opportunity to observe his or her
demeanor and make a credibility determination based on that
observation.
While the advantages or disadvantages of leaving the credibility determination to the jury are certainly subject to debate,279
even if the jury is assumed to be the best entity for credibility
determinations, the Pennsylvania courts' adherence to the
Nanty-Glo rule prevents summary judgment from achieving its
designed goals because it unduly restricts summary judgment
use to instances where the proof is almost entirely documentary.
Furthermore, with slight modifications, the Nanty-Glo rule could
be applied in such a way as to allow the jury to make credibility
is not enough for the plaintiff, in resisting summary judgment
the court stated that "[fit
to argue that there is a jury question as to malice; he must make a showing of facts from
which malice may be inferred ....Such an inference must be clear." Id. at 1348 (emphasis added). The Brophy court, after disavowing Curran, stated the standard to be "viewing the evidence and all inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, there appears a genuine issue of fact from which a jury could reasonably find
actual malice with convincing clarity." Brophy, 422 A.2d at 632. The difference between
the two standards is unclear. Furthermore, the use of the higher burden of persuasion
should not, logically, affect the roles of judge and jury in credibility determinations. The
Nanty.Glo rule is based on the premise that the jury is the appropriate entity to make
credibility determinations. If the rule is accepted, the jury remains the appropriate
entity irrespective of the burden of proof imposed on the plaintiff.
276. PA. R. Civ. P. 1035(c) (rescinded 1996).
277. Id. 1035.3(d).
278. Id. 1035.1.
279. See sources cited supra at note 42.
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determinations in situations where credibility is an issue, while
at the same time allowing courts to grant summary judgment in
cases where the proof is testimonial. Arguably, the new summary judgment rules permit the courts to do so because they specifically permit the use of testimonial evidence in support of
summary judgment motions.28 ° Pennsylvania courts typically
deny summary judgment in this situation, however, due to the
belief that the credibility determination of all witnesses, even
disinterested ones, is for the jury.28 ' Pennsylvania courts, therefore, hold that even an unopposed summary judgment motion
supported by testimonial evidence must be denied, as the movant
has not proved its case since the credibility of the witnesses has
not been demonstrated.8 2
Burdening the movant with the need to prove the credibility of
the witness may be inappropriate for several reasons. When a
motion for summary judgment is supported by testimonial evidence, that evidence may be elicited from the movant itself or
from witnesses who have no interest in the outcome of the litigation. In its present formulation, the Nanty-Glo rule makes no
distinction between these different sources of testimonial evidence. While there is some historical support for Nanty-Glo's
treatment of all testimonial evidence as equal regardless of the
source, the support is relatively weak. As previously noted,2 8
Pennsylvania courts evinced little concern for the credibility of
witnesses until the latter part of the nineteenth century, when
parties to the litigation were first allowed to testify. Only after
the change in practice allowing parties to be witnesses on their
own behalf did Pennsylvania courts begin to stress that questions of credibility should be left to the jury.28 4 While it is true
that nineteenth century Pennsylvania courts never drew a bright
line between the testimony of parties and disinterested witnesses, they almost invariably accorded greater weight to the
testimony of disinterested witnesses. 2 5 From a historical per280. PA. R. Crv. P. 1035.1. At the same time, the rules do not directly prohibit a
grant of summary judgment based on testimonial evidence, although Nanty-Glo is cited
in the comments to Rule 1035.2. See id. 1035.2.
281. See Garcia v. Savage, 586 A.2d 1375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
282. See Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co. v. Nenna & Frain, Inc., 467 A.2d 330 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1983).
283. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
285. Statements to the effect that the testimony of disinterested witnesses is enti-

tled to greater weight than the testimony of the parties are common in court opinions.
See, e.g., Lonzer v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 46 A. 937, 938 (Pa. 1900) (stating: "When the
testimony is not improbable ... and comes from witnesses whose candor there is no
apparent ground for doubting, the jury is not at liberty to indulge in a capricious
disbelief.").
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spective, therefore, Nanty-Glo arguably misinterpreted preexisting Pennsylvania law. The seventy-plus years that have
passed since Nanty-Glo was decided, however, have reinforced
the courts' tendency to treat all testimonial evidence equally in
deciding summary judgment motions.
Outside the summary judgment setting, Pennsylvania courts
continue to give greater weight to the testimony of disinterested
witnesses than to the testimony of the parties themselves. 6
Although the deference is not great, and the testimony of disinterested witnesses is not conclusive if contradicted by the testimony of the opposing party, or if the witnesses are impeached, 8 7
giving credence to the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of
the disinterested witness comports with common sense. Employing the same test for both summary judgment and trial also
makes sense, and for these reasons the practice of according
greater deference to the testimony of a disinterested witness
should be followed in the summary judgment setting.
Beyond the issue of the historical validity of Nanty-Glo in the
disinterested witness situation, the rule also raises procedural
concerns. Summary judgment requires a movant who will bear
the burden of persuasion at trial to prove two things in the
papers submitted to the court. 28 First, the movant must produce
evidence in support of the motion that proves every element of
the prima facie case.28 9 If the supporting documents fail to prove
an essential element of the movant's case, the motion should be
denied even if unopposed.2 9 ° Second, the movant must demonstrate that there is no genuine dispute regarding the veracity of
286. See Lowery v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 235 A.2d 805, 807 (Pa. 1967)(stating it
improper for Workmen's Compensation Board to disregard "uncontradicted testimony
which was substantiated by another, disinterested witness"); Walters v. Am. Bridge Co.,
82 A. 1103 (Pa. 1912)(affirming trial court's grant of judgment n.o.v. when verdict contrary to unimpeached testimony of disinterested witnesses).
287. See Linsenmeyer v. Straits, 166 A.2d 18 (Pa. 1960Xholding testimony of disinterested witnesses inconclusive when contradicted by testimony of opposing party and
impeached by prior inconsistent statements).
288. Both federal Rule 56 and former Pennsylvania Rule 1035 require a summary
judgment movant to demonstrate a lack of a genuine issue of material fact and an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c); PA. R. Civ. P. 1035(b)
(rescinded 1996). The new rules incorporate the same requirement: "[a] party may move
for summary judgment ... as a matter of law (1) whenever there is no genuine issue of
any material fact." PA. R. CIv. P. 1035.2.
289. See Dorohovich v. West American Ins. Co., 589 A.2d 252, 256 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991) (stating: 'Summary judgment is only appropriate where.., the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").
290. See Amabile v. Auto Kleen Car Wash, 376 A.2d 247, 250 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977)
(holding it improper to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment when supporting
documents "do not either 1) refute a material allegation in plaintiffs complaint ... or 2)
present a complete defense to the action").
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his or her proof.29 1 If the respondent submits no evidence in
opposition to the motion, documentary evidence is adequate to
perform this task. 29 2 There is a working presumption that documents submitted in support of the motion are authentic and
prove what they purport to show.29 3 The filing of documentary
material sufficient to prove a movant's primafacie case shifts the
burden of production to the respondent to come forward with evidence placing the movant's proof in doubt.29 4 While a movant
who supports a summary judgment motion with documentary
evidence may fail the first part of the summary judgment test
even if the respondent files nothing in opposition to the
motion,29 5 the same movant should never fail the second part of
the test unless the respondent files material in opposition to the
motion.2 96
The Nanty-Glo rule effectively changes these procedural rules
when the movant's proof is testimonial in nature. In such cases,
the burden on the respondent to produce materials contravening
the evidence in support of the motion is removed. At least under
the former rule, the respondent had the option of remaining passive in this situation since the effect of the Nanty-Glo rule was to
create an irrebuttable presumption that the credibility of the
97
movant's witnesses might be successfully attacked at trial.2 No
matter how straightforward or facially compelling the testimonial evidence might be, Nanty-Glo required the respondent to be
afforded the opportunity to cross examine the witness in court.2 98
291. Id. at 249-50.
292. Id. at 250.
293. Id.
294. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
295. Failure could occur because the evidence submitted in support of the motion
simply does not prove a material element of the movant's case.
296. For instance, assume a simple breach of contract case in which A sues B alleging that B has failed to pay sums due under a contract. If A files a motion for summary
judgment supported by a copy of a contract signed by A and C, A should not prevail
because there has been no proof of a prima facie case, i.e., no proof that A and B ever
entered into a contract. If, however, A submits a contract signed by B, the truth of the
matters stated in the contract (the dates, the consideration, and other terms) will be
accepted as true unless B files material in opposition to the motion. This procedure effectively resolves any credibility issues relating to the document, such as whether it has
been altered, and places the burden on the respondent to put those credibility concerns
back in issue.
297. See Ritmanich v. Jonnel Enterprises, Inc., 280 A.2d 570, 574 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1971) (noting that affidavits "even if uncontradicted will not afford sufficient basis for the
entry of summary judgment").
298. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has noted: "A witnesses' credibility is a
determination for the jury and necessarily creates a genuine issue of material fact."
White v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass, Corp., 668 A.2d 136, 142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (citing
Garcia v. Savage, 586 A.2d 1375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)).
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While there may be some theoretical bases for this dissimilar
treatment of the two types of evidence, there was nothing in the
language of former Rule 1035 supporting such a result as the
rule made no distinction between documentary and testimonial
evidence. 299 The plain language of the rule mandated that both
documentary and testimonial evidence have the same procedural
3 00
effect when used to support a summary judgment motion.
More specifically, if the evidence would be adequate to prove a
prima facie case, under former Rule 1035 the burden of production would shift to the respondent to produce evidence showing
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
The new Pennsylvania summary judgment rules may change
this outcome. The note accompanying Rule 1035.2 recognizes
Nanty-Glo and restates the holding that oral testimony alone is
insufficient to establish the absence of a genuine issue of fact.30 '
Rule 1035.3 explicitly permits an adverse party to respond to a
summary judgment motion by "identifying... a challenge to the
credibility of one or more witnesses testifying in support of the
motion."30 2 The form of this challenge is unstated.3 3 The courts,
however, should not permit this challenge to consist of nothing
more than an assertion that because the evidence supporting the
motion is testimonial, credibility is automatically at issue.
Finally, the two assumptions that underlie Nanty-Glo, which
are (1) that cross examination is an effective tool for uncovering
defects in a witness; and (2) juries are well equipped to utilize the
information gleaned from cross-examination to make accurate
determinations regarding a witness' credibility, have come under
increasingly effective attacks in recent years.30 4 The nineteenth
century faith in the efficacy of cross-examination flourished at a
time when discovery in civil cases was quite limited. 30 5 Restric299. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1035(b) (rescinded 1996) (providing that summary judgment
may be granted if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact .... ").
300. The former rule permitted the motion to be supported by testimonial evidence
such as affidavits and answers to depositions. PA. R. Civ. P. 1035(b) (rescinded 1996).
The rule did not mention the use of documentary evidence at all, although such evidence
was often used to support the motion. Id. See, e.g., Rose v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 262
A.2d 851 (Pa. 1970) (noting that motion for summary judgment was properly supported
by copy of "investment letter").
301. PA. R. Crv. P. 1035.2(2).
302. Id. 1035.3 (a)(1).

303. Id. 1035.3. The rule merely states that the adverse party "must file a
response." Id. The rule does not prescribe the form that the response must take. See id.
304.
305.
(1961).

See sources cited supra in note 42.
See Note, Developments in the Law - Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 949-51
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tions on the use of discovery often prompted a witness' bias, character or the inconsistencies and contradictions within the
witness's testimony to be revealed for the first time during cross
examination." 6 Under such circumstances, cross examination
naturally played an important role in credibility determinations.
With the twentieth century expansion of the availability of discovery, however, few commentators still believe that cross-examination, at least impromptu cross-examination, consistently
exposes inconsistencies or other internal weaknesses in witness
testimony.3 0 7 Instances where cross-examination does work to
reveal weaknesses in witness testimony almost invariably result
from the effective use of material found during the course of discovery, which should be available to the respondent in time to be
included in a response to a summary judgment motion.
The ability of an untrained lay juror (or a judge lacking appropriate psychological training) to use demeanor evidence to make
accurate credibility determinations has also been seriously questioned. 30 8 Increasingly, the physical indicia used by most observers to assess credibility appear to be untrue indicators of the
veracity of the witness. While some observers may sometimes
discover mendacity through demeanor evidence, the instances
where this occurs are probably uncommon.
While assessment of witness credibility is the stated justification for Nanty-Glo's requirement that testimonial proof be
presented at trial, few, if any, of the decisions applying the rule
speak of credibility assessments in anything more than the most
general of terms. Opinions founded on Nanty-Glo generally do
not address the means by which credibility is attacked at trial,
nor do they consider whether these means of attack are available
to the respondent at the summary judgement stage. This is
unfortunate because attacks on a witness' credibility are conducted using certain well recognized tactics. Recognizing that
306.

See id.

307. See REx CONRAD, CROss-EXAMINATION OF MEDICAL EXPERTS FROM THE
DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE, AMERICAN LAw INsTrruTE (1990)(providing: "Cross-examination is

probably the most overrated tool available to the trial practitioner; it is probably the most
underrated source of harm done to the cross-examiner himself'); J. Alexander Tanford,
Keeping Cross-ExaminationUnder Control, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 245, 249 (1994) (noting: "Effective cross-examination is the result of thorough investigation, research, and
preparation done well in advance, not of some sixth sense for detecting human weaknesses"); JAMES W. JEANS, TRIAL ADVOCACY § 15.1 (2d ed. 1993). But see RICHARD A.
GIVENS, ADvOCACY § 13.01 (3d ed. 1991).
308. See Wellborn, supra note 42 at 1075. Professor Wellborn notes that
"[aiccording to the empirical evidence, ordinary people cannot make effective use of
demeanor in deciding whether to believe a witness. On the contrary, there is some evidence that the observation of demeanor diminishes rather than enhances the accuracy of
credibility judgments." Id.
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these methods of impeachment are available to a respondent at
the summary judgment stage seriously undermines the need to
strictly apply the Nanty-Glo rule.
Authors have not always reached the same result in attempting to catalog the number of bases on which a witness' credibility
may be impeached. 3° MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE recognizes the
five bases of impeachment listed below. 10
1) Contradiction. Although courts often use this term to
describe what is more properly termed impeachment by prior
inconsistent statements, impeachment through contradiction is
accomplished when evidence contrary to a witness' testimony is
elicited from other sources. 3 1 Contradiction may be established
through documentary evidence31 or through the testimony of
another witness.31 3 Thus, when during direct examination a
plaintiff testifies that he or she never suffered back pains prior to
an auto accident involving the defendant, the contradictory testimony of a physician who treated the plaintiff for back pain prior
to the accident is admissible as a form of impeachment. 1 4
2) Inconsistency. This form of impeachment is often referred
to as impeachment by prior inconsistent statements.1 5 Witnesses may be impeached if they previously made statements
that are contrary to their current testimony.31 6 Such statements
may occur during the course of the pending litigation or during
prior proceedings.317 Pennsylvania law allows the introduction of
prior inconsistent statements for the purpose of impeachment
regardless of the hearsay status of the statements.31 8
3) Partiality. Witnesses may be impeached by showing that
they have an interest in the outcome of the case. 31 9 This form of
309. Professor Uviller counts six means of impeachment. See Uviller, supra note
39. McCormick lists five. JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 33 (4th
ed. 1992). Some earlier writers acknowledge even fewer methods, see, e.g., JAMEs P.
GORTER, LAW OF EVIDENCE 224 (1916) (finding that there are three methods of impeachment), although modern writers may separately list methods that were previously subsumed in other categories. For instance, GORTER states that a witness may be impeached
by "general evidence affecting his credit for veracity." See id. Modern writers might subdivide this "general evidence" into matters of partiality, character, or incoherence.
310. See STRONG, supra note 308 at § 33.
311. Id. § 45 at 62-63.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Bruno v. Brown, 200 A.2d 405 (Pa. 1964).
315. See STRONG, supra note 308 § 38 at 50-52.
316. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thomas, 329 A.2d 277 (Pa. 1974).
317. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brady, 487 A.2d 891 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
318. Commonwealth v. Waller, 444 A.2d 653 (Pa. 1982).
319. See STRONG, supra note 308 § 39 at 52-53.
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impeachment may occur either when a witness wishes to ensure
3 20
the victory of one party or the defeat of another.
4) Character. Witnesses may be impeached by showing that
they have a general reputation for being untruthful. 2 ' Character impeachment is generally accomplished by calling other witnesses who are able to testify as to the primary witness'
reputation for truthfulness. 2 2 A witness' character may also be
3 23
placed into question by evidence of prior criminal conviction(s).
5) Incoherence. Incoherence is often attributable to defects in
witnesses' perceptive abilities.3 24 The internal inconsistencies,
omissions and implausibility of witness testimony can provide a
basis for impeachment. 2 5 Thus, a witness who testified that he
or she overheard a conversation in a crowded airport could be
impeached during cross examination by questions revealing that
the witness has a hearing impairment. 2 6
Other authors have also added demeanor to the list of bases
for impeachment, 27 and this addition seems appropriate as
demeanor is certainly one factor for the factfinder to consider in
determining the credibility of a witness.
Assuming that the prior list represents a complete compilation
of methods by which the credibility of witnesses may be
impeached, it is readily apparent that a respondent to a summary judgment motion should often know, at least by the end of
discovery, whether there is any likelihood of impeaching the
movant's witnesses at trial. With the exception of demeanor,
each means of impeachment involves using material that the
respondent should become aware of during the investigation of
the case. If a respondent to a summary judgment motion is
aware of all plausible grounds for impeachment, and if an
unimpeached witness is entitled to a presumption of truthfulness, then denying summary judgment so that an advocate can
engage in an unfounded attack on the credibility of that witness
makes little sense. If a party has a basis for doubting a witness'
credibility, this basis should be revealed to the court at the summary judgment stage so that the court's assessment of the
motion is rational and informed. An irrebuttable presumption
that a witness' credibility may be successfully attacked at trial,
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Commonwealth v. Black, 487 A.2d 396 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
See STRONG, supra note 308 § 41 at 54-55.
Id. § 43 at 59-60.
Id. § 42 at 55-59.
Id. § 44 at 60-62.

325. Id.
326.
327.

See STRONG, supra note 308 § 44 at 60-62.
See, e.g., Uviller, supra note 42.
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such as that embodied in Nanty-Glo, should only rarely usurp
the motion judge's discretion in such matters.
The four recognized bases for impeachment known as contradiction, inconsistency, bias and character should be easily
demonstrable to the court by a party wishing to oppose summary
judgment. The motion for summary judgment should not be
made before the close of discovery, and if the party opposing
summary judgment wishes to have more time to complete discovery, he or she may request the time from the court. 328 Assuming
that a respondent has completed discovery, he or she should have
every piece of evidence that will be available at trial to contradict
a witness' statement at the time of a summary judgment motion.
In fact, the production of contradictory evidence may be the most
common method of demonstrating to a court the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact. If a respondent to a summary
judgment motion is unable to provide the court with such eviaence, there seems to be little point in allowing the case to proceed unless the respondent provides the court with some other
assurance that the witness' credibility might be impeached at
trial.
Inconsistency in the form of prior inconsistent statements
should also be demonstrable at the summary judgment stage. In
the post-discovery setting, a respondent should possess every
inconsistent statement made by a witness that would be available at trial. Certainly if a respondent submits to the court a
prior inconsistent statement from an individual whose testimony
forms the basis of a summary judgment motion, the submission
should raise a genuine issue of material fact and provide a basis
for denying the motion. If a respondent is unaware of any prior
inconsistent statements, then attempted impeachment on this
basis at trial would seem both pointless and unethical.329
A respondent should also be aware of any bias held by an affiant when a summary judgment motion is filed. If the testimonial
evidence in support of the summary judgment motion comes
from a party to the action, then indeed the motion should be
denied without ever requiring the respondent to make any bias
evaluations. 33 0 Any interest in the outcome of the litigation held
328.
329.

PA. R. Civ. P. 1035.3(b).
See ROBERTO ARON ET AL., EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES, § 5.11 (1989) (sug-

gesting that cross-examination should be limited to questions having a "reasonable foundation in fact or in admissible evidence"). See also STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL
ADVOCACY, 109 (1993) (noting that cross examination may not be based on "rumors,
uncorroborated hearsay, or pure speculation").
330. Professor Sonenshein has argued that a witness' interest in the outcome of liti-

gation, standing alone, should not constitute an adequate basis for denying summary
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by an affiant should either be uncovered by the respondent during the course of discovery or during informal investigation of the
claim. As with the previously discussed bases of impeachment, if
a respondent makes the existence of bias known to the court,
then credibility becomes an issue and denial of the motion is
proper.
Character evidence should also be known by a respondent at
the time a summary judgment motion is made. If a respondent
presents the court with an affidavit from a witness willing to testify that a movant's witness has a reputation for mendacity,
denial of the motion should result. Denial of the summary judgment motion should likewise ensue if a respondent presents the
court with evidence of a prior criminal conviction of a movant's
witness331
The fifth basis of impeachment, incoherence, may be more difficult to demonstrate at the summary judgment level. The problem here arises not when the witness' incoherence is caused by
physical limitations, but when the witness' testimony just does
not make sense. This is a form of incoherence that a carefully
tailored affidavit may also conceal. For instance, if a witness
previously testified that he or she was at point A at 10:00 a.m.
and drove to point B by 10:15 a.m., and subsequently under
cross-examination the witness estimates the distance between
points A and B to be 50 miles, the witness is effectively
impeached because of the incoherence of the testimony. A carefully drafted affidavit, however, may delete all references to point
A, or, alternatively, fail to mention the times at which the witness claims to have been at the different places. If the affidavit is
judgment. See Sonenshein, supra note 95. Sonenshein supports this argument by use of
a hypothetical involving a contract between two parties for the painting of a house. Id. at
801. In that hypothetical, if one of the parties files an affidavit asserting the existence of
a contract, there would seem to be no reason to proceed to trial unless the other party can
provide the court with contradictory evidence. Id. at 802. Sonenshein then hedges his
argument by asserting that summary judgment based on a party's affidavit is only appropriate if the respondent "must" be aware of contradictory evidence. Id. The problem with
this approach lies in the difficulty of ascertaining when a party "must" know of contradictory evidence. Laziness, ineptitude, and perhaps most important, lack of resources, may
hinder a party's ability to obtain contradictory evidence. Although one may not have
much sympathy for the party whose problems are caused by the first two matters, penalizing the litigant who simply cannot afford to conduct depositions seems unfair.
331. Sonenshein also argues that this situation should not provide a basis for denying summary judgment. See Sonenshein, supra note 95. He asserts that while witnesses
may be impeached on this basis, the "fact does not prove objectively that their testimony
is untrue." Id. at 708. This argument would seem to carry as much weight at the trial
stage as at the summary judgment stage. Cases can, however, be won solely through
impeachment without the introduction of contradictory evidence. While such instances
may be unusual, parties should at least be afforded the opportunity to make the attempt,
provided they have some reasonable basis for impeachment.
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so carefully constructed, then the incoherence of the testimony
may not be apparent from the affidavit's face. Only when the
witness is subject to cross-examination will the weaknesses in
the proffered testimony become apparent. At least from the
traditional viewpoint, a witness should be forced to run the
gauntlet of cross-examination before his or her testimony may be
used to form the basis for a judgment.
While there may be some reasons to suggest that a party
responding to a summary judgment motion should have the right
to cross-examine the movant's witnesses and attempt to impeach
them through the incoherence of their testimony, there are also
reasons to suggest that the respondent should be required to
show the court that the cross-examination has a reasonable
chance of success before being accorded this opportunity. We no
longer live in an age when the expense and delay of cross examination can be ignored, and as previously noted, modern commentators generally devalue the worth of impromptu crossexamination as a means of assisting in credibility determinations.332 Additionally, without some foreknowledge that a witness credibility attack might be successful, ethical concerns are
implicated when an advocate makes the attack even on the basis
of incoherence.
Furthermore, while a respondent may not have the opportunity to cross-examine a witness in court prior to a decision on the
summary judgment motion, it should have the opportunity to
depose a witness prior to the disposition of that motion.333
Admittedly, depositions usually lack the sometimes fiery nature
of courtroom cross-examination, but obvious inconsistencies in
the witness' testimony should be discoverable through this technique.334 Moreover, when an attorney attempts to impeach a wit332. In addition to the authority cited supra in note 308, see also STRONG, supra
note 308 at § 31 (noting that cross-examination has "its own hazards of producing
errors").
333. Many attorneys would prefer to avoid the expense of depositions and simply
await trial for the opportunity to seek out inconsistencies in testimony. The proposed
change in the Nanty-Glo rule may cause these attorneys some inconvenience. A more
troublesome problem arises when a litigant is simply unable to pay for depositions. In
light of inability to proceed in forma pauperis to obtain deposition testimony, carving out
an exception to the proposed rule denying the summary judgment motion maybe appropriate when a respondent demonstrates to the court that it reasonably believes the testimony embodied in the movant's affidavit to be suspect and that it is unable to pay for
depositions. Rules 1035.3(b) and (c), permitting the court to "make such other order as is
just" when the respondent sets "forth the reasons why the party cannot present evidence
essential to justify opposition to the motion," could be interpreted to achieve this result.
334. See Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. United States, 135 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1943).
In Radio City, the plaintiff filed suit seeking a return of taxes that had been erroneously
paid. Id. at 716. After depositions, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment and supported the motion with transcripts of the deposition testimony. Id. at 717. The defendant
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ness by showing inconsistencies in testimony, he or she usually
has some basis for suspecting that the testimony is incomplete or
otherwise suspect. There is little point in cross-examining an
adverse witness at length unless the advocate entertains some
suspicion that the testimony will not hold together. Mandating
that a respondent reveal the bases for these suspicions to the
court at the summary judgment stage should not be too onerous
a requirement.
Thus, while there is some reason to believe that a successful
attack on witness credibility based on inconsistencies may be
made at trial, there are also countervailing indications that a
respondent should have some articulable basis for suspecting
that a witness' testimony contains inconsistencies at the time a
motion for summary judgment is made. If a respondent wishes
to cross-examine a witness in an attempt to impeach through
inconsistencies, he or she should be forced to reveal the basis for
believing in the success of such cross-examination at the summary judgment stage. If a respondent is unable to articulate a
basis for the perceived need to cross-examine a witness, the court
should not permit a trial simply so the respondent can engage in
a "fishing expedition."
The sixth basis for impeachment, demeanor, is obviously a
matter that cannot be demonstrated to the court at the time of a
motion for summary judgment. Demeanor is a matter over
which a respondent has little foreknowledge and hence little control. Requiring an unimpeached, disinterested witness to testify
in open court so that the fact finder might have an opportunity to
observe the witness' demeanor is justifiable only if (1) the court
believes that there is a reasonable chance the fact-finder will disbelieve an otherwise unimpeached witness because of that witness' demeanor, and (2) the court further believes that the factfinder will correctly use demeanor evidence in reaching this
disbelief.
opposed the motion, at least in part because of a contention that it should be given the
opportunity to cross examine the deponents before the fact finder. Id. at 718. In rejecting
this argument the court noted:
There would be much force in this, if the motion had been heard merely
upon affidavits; the right to cross examine [the deponents] was almost the defendant's only protection. But it did full cross-examine them, and did not shake their
testimony... it does not even suggest that [their] recollection was in fact mistaken
...
[that does not make a 'genuine issue'.
Id. The court went on to suggest that the respondent had a duty "atleast to specify some
opposing evidence which it can adduce" to contradict the deposition testimony. Id. Under
the rule proposed in this article, the burden on a respondent would be even less. Instead
of specifying evidence that would be produced at trial, the respondent would only be
required to point to specific matters in the deposition transcript that could bring the deponent's credibility into question.
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Historically, courts have given great weight to a jury's use of
demeanor evidence in assessing the credibility of a witness.
Judge Frank's opinion in Arnstein v. Porter33 5 contains numerous
citations to cases where courts have spoken favorably of the
value of observing a witness' demeanor when determining the
truthfulness of testimony. Nonetheless, there is mounting evidence that fact-finders (whether judge or jury) are incapable of
using demeanor evidence accurately in assessing the credibility
of witnesses. 3 6
Demeanor consists of the witness' body language, manner of
dress, accent, manner of speech and other intangibles,3 37 and has
been called the "touchstone" of credibility.3
Courts have long
cherished the belief that a lay jury can use these visual and auditory clues to accurately assess witness credibility. 33 9 Recent
studies, however, suggest that demeanor evidence used by jurors
in making credibility determinations often leads to inaccurate
results.3 4 °
Commentators have suggested that this inaccuracy of credibility determinations is caused, at least in part, by the typical
juror's focus on body language as the primary indicator of truthfulness; a focus often reinforced by the court's instructions on
credibility determinations.3 41 But body language is relatively
easy for the dissembling witness to control and may thus lead to
inaccurate credibility determinations. In fact, more accurate
credibility determinations may be made by focusing on auditory
clues, such as tone of voice and hesitant speech. 42 Some studies
335. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1947). The Arnstein court quoted extensively from other
courts, and stated that "the demeanor of witnesses is recognized as a highly useful, even
if not an infallible, method of ascertaining the truth and accuracy of their narratives."
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 470.
336. Olin G. Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1991). While much
literature addressing the jury's ability to detect mendacity through observation of
demeanor is recent, there have been murmurs of doubt for quite some time. Even Judge
Frank, an apparent advocate of the jury's right to make credibility determinations, questioned the ability of jurors to perform this function. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL,,
118-20 (1949).
337. Ingulli, Trial by Jury: Reflections on Witness Credibility, Expert Testimony,
and Recantation, 20 VAL. U.L. REV. 145 (1986), cited in Friedland, supra note 42.
338. Megoulas v. Megoulas, 72 A.2d 598, 599 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1950).
339. See Wellborn, supra note 335.
340. See id.
341. In Pennsylvania, the problem is compounded by the lack of a standard jury
instruction regarding credibility assessments. This lack of an instruction leaves jurors
free to use their own common sense standards in credibility determinations. These sorts
of determinations, however, are frequently inaccurate, particularly in the courtroom setting where a witness' normal mannerisms may be affected by the environment.
342. See Bella M. DePaulo et al., Actual and Perceived Cues to Deception:A Closer
Look at Speech, 3 BAsic AND APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291 (1982).
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have suggested that a confident yet untruthful witness is more
likely to be believed than an honest but nervous witness.3
Scholars have suggested that the accuracy of credibility determinations could be improved by revising the typical jury instruction on the use of demeanor evidence,3 44 or by the use of an
expert witness.345 While these suggestions may result in more
accurate credibility determinations in the future, however, we
are nonetheless presently employing a system of credibility
determinations that has dubious chances for success. Even if
this system was cost-free (which it most assuredly is not), we
would be well advised to question the wisdom of a rule that
requires every witness to present his or her testimony in open
court before a judgment is entered, even in instances where the
opponent cannot point to any basis for suspecting that the witness is being less than truthful and accurate.
Under the rule proposed by this article, a respondent would be
required to raise the credibility of a witness in responding to a
motion for summary judgment unless the witness was a party to
the litigation. Raising the credibility issue could be accomplished through using any of the materials mentioned in Rule
1035, or, in an appropriate case, simply through a brief filed in
opposition to the motion.34 If a respondent fails to raise the
issue of credibility, then the court should be entitled to assume
that credibility is not a concern and thus grant the summary
judgment motion. In cases where the testimonial evidence
originated with a party to the litigation, the potential bias of the
witness would be obvious to the court and opposition by the
respondent would be unnecessary.
This result is clearly justifiable under the new rules. Those
rules require a "challenge" to the credibility of the witness, and
that challenge should take the form of something more meaningful than a simple incantation of the Nanty-Glo rule.

343. This observation reinforces what many courtroom observers have long suspected. See STRONG, supra note 308.
344. See Blumenthal, supra note 42 at 1201. But see Friedland, supra note 42 at
188.
345. See Friedland, supra note 42 at 169 (suggesting that expert testimony in aid of
credibility determinations should generally be excluded, but concluding that exceptions
may be necessary).
346. This procedure would comport with the language in Rule 1035.3(a)(1) requiring
a 'challenge" to the credibility of the witness. See PA. R. Crv. P. 1035.3 (a)(1). Of course,
it would be well to provide evidentiary material if available.
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CONCLUSION

When viewed from a historical perspective, the problems
encountered by courts in resolving credibility disputes in the
summary judgment context are not surprising. Summary judgment's procedural antecedents worked extremely well when
employed in matters that involved, almost exclusively, documentary evidence. So long as summary judgment was restricted to
cases involving debt and contract, credibility issues were minimal or non-existent. As the procedure enjoyed such great success
in those areas, the temptation to expand its reach was irresistible. The graduation to trans-substantive applicability, however,
brought with it questions about the appropriate resolution of
credibility issues.
At the federal level, initial concerns over the propriety of
granting summary judgment based on testimonial evidence seem
to have subsided. Given the Supreme Court's "marching orders"
to the lower federal courts to be more liberal in granting summary judgment, it seems that credibility issues, for the foreseeable future, will be of little concern in that system. This may not
be an unsound development on the federal level, but it does not
necessarily follow that Pennsylvania courts should abandon
their own jurisprudence and follow the federal lead.
Pennsylvania courts have a long history of according great deference to the fact finder's credibility determinations, and there is
no reason to completely abandon that deference in summary
judgment proceedings. The courts can, however, demand some
assurance from the summary judgment respondent that credibility will be an issue at trial. If a respondent is unwilling or
unable to provide the assurance, then deference to the fact finder
should not mandate a plenary trial proceeding.
Evidentiary issues in the summary judgment context inevitably involve a balancing of the need for a full plenary examination
of the evidence and a speedy resolution of the legal conflict. In
every case brought before a court, some new evidence, or some
nuance about known evidence, will be uncovered during the
course of an evidentiary hearing. The decision to allow summary
judgment in any instance indicates a belief by the court that the
additional evidence to be disclosed at a hearing is simply not
worth the cost and effort necessarily expended to draw out that
information. Thus, courts that deny summary judgment where
the non-moving party has produced a "scintilla" of evidence in
opposition to the motion have placed a higher value on the benefits of a plenary hearing than the courts that use a "reasonable
jury" standard in passing on such motions. The question that
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must be faced, therefore, is whether requiring the jury to pass on
the credibility of disinterested third party witnesses, as mandated by Nanty-Glo, elicits sufficient additional information to
warrant the time and expense of the resultant plenary hearing.
While Nanty-Glo may have been justifiable originally, increasing pressures on court dockets, expanded discovery procedures
and changes in summary judgment jurisprudence at the federal
level make this an appropriate time to reexamine the use of the
rule. While unquestioned acceptance of the federal summary
judgment jurisprudence is not necessary, a critical reexamination of the assumptions underlying Nanty-Glo may result in a
revised rule that will both preserve the fact finder's role in credibility determinations and simultaneously speed up the administration of justice.

